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In recent years, the need has grown for improvement and standardisation of methods for emergency needs
assessments to respond to criticisms and suggestions from NGOs, food aid practitioners and donors. The World
Food Programme, as the leading UN agency responsible for food aid, has been taking important steps to address
this issue by developing a Emergency Food Security Assessment (EFSA) handbook and through research works on
assessment methodologies.
However, it is also essential for WFP to know how emergency needs assessments have been carried out in practice.
This is because the reality of needs assessments is often different from the ideal. Striking a balance between the
reality and the ideal is one of the challenges of needs assessment.
For this reason, WFP’s Emergency Needs Assessment Branch (ODAN) believes that ‘reality checks’ are important
tasks. As a first example of such a ‘reality check’, a meta-analysis was undertaken to review the practice of
emergency needs assessment in Ethiopia. Between five and eight million Ethiopians have been chronically food-
insecure for decades, and there have been a number of emergency needs assessments. These assessments have
given rise to arguments and discussion. We believe that an objective and neutral meta-analysis will be a great
help, not only to future emergency needs assessment practice in Ethiopia but also in our on-going efforts to
improve emergency needs assessments generally.
May 2006
Wolfgang Herbinger,
Chief, Emergency Needs Assessment Branch (ODAN), Operation Department
United Nations World Food Programme (WFP), Rome
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This study reviews the practice of Emergency Needs
Assessment (ENA) in Ethiopia as it relates to food security. It
is meant to inform efforts by the World Food Programme
(WFP) to improve ENA practice globally. It considers the
question of overall rigour in needs estimation, and explores
the ability of assessments to analyse the role of markets,
non-food response options, chronic and transitory needs
and the impact of food aid.
As part of its overall efforts to improve ENA practice (in
particular the European Commission (EC)-supported SENAC
process), WFP/ODAN contracted ODI to conduct a critical
review of ENA practice in Ethiopia, as a case study on
emergency assessments in contexts of protracted food in-
security. While neither a comprehensive review of general
food security and vulnerability issues, nor an exercise to
develop an improved methodology per se, the study examines
recent ENA practice and related critiques, focusing on weak-
nesses in current practice and opportunities for strength-
ening it. It is hoped that the findings will be of relevance to
actors within Ethiopia, as well as those concerned with
improving practice globally.
The term ENA is clarified, with the study preferring the
more specific term Emergency Food Security Assessment
(EFSA). This reflects a broader perspective than the deter-
mination of food needs (as would be the case with an
Emergency Food Needs Assessment, or EFNA), while
keeping the focus on food security as opposed to the other
sectoral needs included in a broader ENA.
The study reviews the complex livelihood and political
context within Ethiopia, along with the inertia created by
many years of massive humanitarian need, and notes that this
complexity and inertia have a direct bearing on EFSA practice
– both in terms of the analytical demands of EFSAs and the
ability to make dynamic improvements to the system.
A review of the evolution of EFSA in Ethiopia shows a long
history of expert inputs and significant investment by both
the Government of Ethiopia (GoE) and international actors
in EFSA practice. An EFSA system exist, and is officially
endorsed by the GoE and supported by key international
actors.The technical credibility of that system, however, rests
on a mixture of non-systematic methods, and is ultimately
based on negotiations between assessment teams,
government agencies and international agencies – a process
that is open to wide-ranging biases at all stages (community,
district, regional and national levels). This may inflate or
suppress actual humanitarian needs, depending on the
interests of particular actors. These concerns are widely
known by the different stakeholders within Ethiopia.
These issues notwithstanding, the combined efforts of the
GoE, donors, NGOs and UN agencies have largely provided
adequate information to inform interventions (comple-
mentary to people’s own survival and coping capacities)
designed to prevent large-scale famine in Ethiopia in recent
years. Even so, this study identifies both an imperative need
to strengthen EFSA practice, and a number of opportunities
for doing so.
While clear opportunities exist on the methodological
side, improving EFSA practice requires significant
institutional and political will. The GoE is undergoing
rapid change, and this affords an opportunity to provide
visions and ideas for improved practice. There is also
critical awareness by international actors of the need to
improve EFSA practice globally, and as such now is a good
time to channel that energy, expertise, financial resources
and commitment towards improving EFSA in Ethiopia and
elsewhere.
All actors – GoE, donors, implementing agencies,
beneficiaries – should demand evidence and sound analysis
to inform decisions about food security policies and
appropriate forms of intervention.They should be prepared
to challenge assessment findings on the grounds of technical
rigour. In this regard, the process would benefit from
incentive/disincentive mechanisms that acknowledge and
reward sound practice.Without this consistent pressure and
demand for sound analysis, even the most credible,
evidence-based methodologies will be easily sidelined.
In summary, the key opportunities for strengthening EFSA
identified in this study include the following.
Concepts, analysis and indicators
• Clarify and reduce to a core minimum the key indicators
for monitoring, to provide the basis for a manageable,
reliable monitoring system that permits livelihoods-
based analysis.
• Promote understanding and awareness among all actors
to broaden thinking from the current ‘food availability’
focus towards operationalising a broader understanding
of food security based on access, availability and
utilisation.
• Incorporate structural analysis (political, economic,
environmental, social) into the current operational
definition of chronic vulnerability for the PSNP, which
currently emphasises a functional approach based on
previous food aid receipts.
• Clarify the term ‘non-food response’ such that the
potential for enhanced food security analysis is not
obscured: that is, to ensure that EFSAs include analysis
Executive summary
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of all available options for mitigating food insecurity,
not necessarily food aid per se.
• Identify measurable indicators that warrant a food aid
intervention at the outset, agreeing on the anticipated
changes in those indicators resulting from the inter-
vention, and monitoring the indicators to understand the
intervention impact.
Assessment approaches and methodology
• Explicitly and systematically incorporate an ‘evidence-
based’ approach to all assessment work, drawing on
available secondary data as well as appropriately collected
primary data.
• Incorporate quantitative field methods where appropriate
to complement current field practice, which is mostly
qualitative.
• Develop improved, relevant and geographically
expanded baseline information on livelihoods.
• Time and plan EFSA activities more closely around the
relevant seasonal time period for various livelihood and
climatic zones of Ethiopia.
• Explicitly explore the possibilities of market interventions
to mitigate food insecurity for a particular emergency
(e.g. subsidies, policy shifts, communication of market
data to traders and the public).
• Explicitly draw on the available market reports in the
overall analysis of humanitarian needs, with reference
to market impact, fluctuations and other factors.
Systems, structures and linkages
• Strategically and explicitly integrate EFSA within an
overall humanitarian/food security information system,
including baseline data, early warning/monitoring,
emergency assessment, impact evaluation, context
monitoring and programme evaluation.
• Place greater emphasis on regional-based analysis
(which would be more livelihood- and season-
appropriate), as opposed to the current emphasis on
central analysis, including through capacity-building
and strengthening institutions at decentralised levels.
• Make explicit linkages between the WFP-led chronic
vulnerability index (CVI) and the identification of
chronically food-insecure beneficiaries for the Pro-
ductive Safety Net Programme (PSNP).
• Ensure adequate human and financial resources are
available for analysis proportional to the complexity of
the Ethiopian context, including considering expanding
VAM capacity to meet both internal (to WFP) and external
information and coordination demands.
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1.1 Background
This study reviews recent Emergency Needs Assessment
(ENA) practice in Ethiopia as it relates to food security. It is
meant to inform efforts by WFP to improve ENA practice
globally. It considers the question of overall rigour in needs
estimation, and explores the ability of assessments to analyse
the role of markets, non-food response options, chronic and
transitory needs and the impact of food aid.The study notes
the apparent irony that, while Ethiopia has one of the longest
histories of emergency assessment practice with relatively
high expert input (including from WFP), current annual ENA
practice is largely based on negotiations between assessment
teams, government agencies and international agencies – a
process that is open to wide-ranging biases at all stages:
community, district, regional and national. This can lead to
actual humanitarian needs being inflated or understated,
depending on the interests and perspective of particular
actors.
The humanitarian situation in Ethiopia is precarious, and it
has been suggested that poverty and vulnerability to food
insecurity are increasing (Sharp and Devereux, 2003). In
addition, there are implications for long-term development
of continuous large-scale emergency programming, and
enormous financial implications flowing from cyclical
emergency programming (an annual average of $282
million between 1997 and 2002). Given these, the current
emphasis on negotiations, as opposed to systematic and credible
technical procedures for determining emergency food
security needs, is alarming. Divergent views concerning the
Government of Ethiopia (GoE)/international community
Flash Appeal in May 2005 reflect the lack of consensus that
results when credible analysis is not the basis for determining
humanitarian needs (see Chapter 4 for further discussion).
While concerted efforts to improve current practice are
warranted (and have been widely recognised as such by key
actors for many years), the Ethiopia context poses numerous
challenges to improving ENA practice. Key to this discussion
is the unique political environment, in which WFP and
other humanitarian actors are obliged to work largely
within the GoE’s agenda, and according to its expectations.
While on the one hand close collaboration with the GoE is
laudable and consistent with goals of ownership, rights-
based approaches and capacity-building, on the other this
proximity can compromise the independence of humani-
tarian agencies and the objectivity of assessments.
Additional complicating factors for ENA practice in
Ethiopia include the sheer scale of humanitarian needs
(ranging from five to fourteen million people in need in
recent years), the high degree of livelihood complexity
throughout the country, the variety of shocks to which
people are exposed, and the complexity of seasonal
patterns across the country. Less obvious factors affecting
ENA practice are the inertia created by years of food aid
provision; the geopolitical significance of Ethiopia; and a
‘famine-fear’ syndrome among humanitarian actors.
Given that Ethiopia has experienced famine of horrific scale
and has the potential to do so again, some analysts have
credited the GoE, humanitarian actors and current ENA
practice (despite its apparent weaknesses) with providing
adequate information to inform the interventions necessary
to have generally avoided widespread famine in recent years,
although there have been pockets of crisis (Lautze et al.,
2003).
The present study, while recognising the accomplishments of
the GoE and humanitarian agencies, presents a critical
examination of current ENA practice. It considers in part-
icular ways of enhancing the linkages between ENA problem
analysis and decisions about appropriate interventions.
1.2 Origins and focus of the study
Concern with ENA practice is not unique to Ethiopia.
Globally, the integrity and comprehensiveness of ENA have
been increasingly questioned, with donors, NGOs and UN
agencies actively seeking to improve assessment methods
and promote more holistic emergency food security
interventions. Examples of global initiatives to improve
food-related ENA practice include developments related to
the SPHERE standards; the SMART process; the FAO-
Netherlands Partnership Programme; USAID/FEWS NET’s
recent initiatives; SC-UK’s on-going efforts at improving
livelihoods analysis; CARE and DFID’s leadership on the
Sustainable Livelihoods Approach; the IASC Needs Analysis
Framework relating to the Consolidated Appeals Process;
and efforts by World Vision, Oxfam and other leading food
security agencies. These initiatives coincide with recent
studies that also highlight the need for improving ENA
practice (e.g. Darcy and Hofmann, 2003; Levine and
Chastre, 2004; Devereux 2003 & 2004).
With support from the European Commission (EC),WFP’s
Strengthening Emergency Needs Assessment Capacity
(SENAC) initiative draws together good practice to date to
develop clear guidelines and methods for conducting
food-related ENA. WFP has produced a substantial manual
with guidelines and methods for conducting Emergency
Food Security Assessments (June 2005), emanating from a
process that included intense consultation with experts
Chapter 1
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(WFP, 2003). The SENAC initiative is launching field
implementation with new regional assessment positions to
develop and pilot specific methodologies.
As part of its broader review of ENA practice, WFP/ODAN
contracted the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) to
conduct a critical review of assessment practice in protracted
emergencies. Ethiopia was suggested as a case study due to
the protracted and complex nature of humanitarian needs
there, the long history of ENA practice and the relevance of
key themes, including the relationship between chronic and
transitory needs and the impact of food aid.While the study
focuses on Ethiopia and considers its numerous unique
factors, most of the key lessons learned and recommen-
dations have relevance to any comparable situation of
protracted food insecurity.
The study was conducted by a team of consultants led by
ODI with extensive experience in Ethiopia and of ENA
practice. It included three visits to Ethiopia, a review of
agency and academic literature and interviews with a wide
range of key informants (see Annex 5 for a list of
interviewees). Limitations of the study include the fact that
it is not based on an empirical analysis of how ‘right’,
‘wrong’ or ‘appropriate’ ENA results have been; instead, the
findings are based on the perceptions of key actors,
triangulated from various perspectives, and the academic
literature. A draft of this paper was reviewed by four peer
reviewers from academic and more applied perspectives, the
WFP Ethiopia office and WFP ODAN.While all the reviewers
provided valuable insights and suggestions, responsibility
for the final draft rests with the study team alone.
The study adopts the following working assumptions:
• WFP and other emergency actors are committed to
international standards of emergency relief, including
SPHERE,WHO and their own progressive agency policies.
• ENA analytical frameworks should be based on the
commonly agreed pillars for food security analysis:
access, availability and utilisation.
• There is a demand for good-quality information and
accountability by key decision-makers, with regard to
the rigour and holistic nature of the analysis.
• It is desirable for WFP to play a leadership role in food
security analysis.
• Food security analysis has a broader meaning than food
aid/needs analysis.
While the focus of the study is on ENA practice itself, rather
than the broader topic of food security and vulnerability
issues in Ethiopia, the subject necessarily requires a brief
review of food security issues in general, and of the political
and livelihood contexts in particular. These are reviewed in
Chapter 2. Chapter 3 of the report provides an overview of
the evolution of ENA practice in Ethiopia, as well as
describing current practice and recent initiatives. Chapter 4
provides a synthesis of critical reviews of current ENA
practice. Chapter 5 examines more closely four key themes
which are problematic for ENA: chronic versus transitory
needs, the role of markets, non-food responses and assessing
the impact and effect of food aid.Throughout Chapters 4 and
5, reviews and critiques of current practice are followed by
suggestions for strengthening it. The conclusion, Chapter 6,
emphasises the need for strong demand for good-quality
information and the technical accounting of findings among
key decision-makers, such as the GoE, implementing agen-
cies and donors.Without such demand and such accounting,
there is little incentive to take the necessary measures to
ensure technically sound ENA.
This study does not seek to design an alternative ENA
method. Rather, it offers a critical review of current practice,
identifying weaknesses and opportunities for improvement.
Previous methodological development is noted in Chapter
3, and it is hoped that the current study will inform
subsequent efforts.
1.3 Clarification of assessment types and process
What questions are needs assessments designed to
answer? An assessment of any kind should be driven and
organised around key questions to inform decision-
making, with clear expectations of how, to what depth
and in what form those questions will be answered.
While basic in nature, different types of assessments
require different types of key driving questions, with
important implications for the required methods. Within
the broad field of ‘humanitarian assessments’, there are a
number of different concepts and terms that are easily
confused, but conceptually distinct, and which if not
distinguished can lead to muddled methods. These terms
include Emergency Food Needs Assessment (EFNA),
Emergency Food Security Assessment (EFSA) and
Emergency Needs Assessment (ENA).
The table below describes the core distinctions between
these types of assessments.1 These are nested, meaning
that EFNA is a subset of EFSA, which is a subset of the
broader ENA. Note that, across and even within many
agencies, there is a lack of consensus on the meaning of
these terms.
The IASC CAP sub-working group released an Interagency
Needs Analysis Framework in April 2005. This illustrates
the broader perspective of an ENA, and how food security
is nested within that framework. It is shown in Figure 1.
Clear determination of the assessment type will have
defining implications for methods, and for who (which
1  This typology is not necessarily endorsed by WFP. Rather, it is meant to
highlight the point that different assessments require different information
and lead to different types of response.
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agencies and types of expertise) should be involved. In
acknowledgement of the limited scope of an EFNA, the
forthcoming WFP assessment guidelines are entitled
Emergency Food Security Assessment Guidelines – clearly
embracing a more encompassing understanding of food
insecurity beyond a food needs assessment per se. While
conceptually robust, in actuality conducting such an
assessment directly challenges conventional practice, and
requires different types of actors than are normally
involved in emergency assessments.
For the purposes of this study, the most applicable term is
Emergency Food Security Assessment (EFSA), which is
consistent with usage in both the Inter-Agency Standing
Committee (IASC) and WFP’s recent assessment
guidelines. This reflects a broader perspective than the
determination of food needs, while keeping the focus on a
holistic understanding of food security as opposed to
other sectoral needs. This report uses the term EFSA in
reference to food security and related needs assessments in
Ethiopia.
Assessment type Overall driving question Scope of response
EFNA What are the food aid needs of the population Targeted food aid distribution
and what role can food aid-based interventions 
play in meeting these needs?
EFSA What are the causes of food insecurity Integrated short-, medium- and long-term responses to
(transitory and chronic) at different levels,  directly increase food access involving resource transfer
and what options are available to mitigate (e.g. food or cash assistance), directly related sectoral
immediate problems and promote long-term interventions and enabling policy adjustments
food security?
ENA What is the broad range of sectoral needs in Multi-sectoral inputs including health, education,
the event of an emergency/disaster? infrastructure water/sanitation, protection, food security
and environment
Table 1: Characterisation of emergency assessment types
Figure 1: Interagency Needs Analysis Framework
14
Education
4
Soc
io-c
ultu
ral 
con
tex
t3Economic context
(Economy, markets, poverty
levels, etc)
6Protection
(from violence and exploitation)
Human rights rule of law
1
Gov
ern
anc
e
(Po
litic
al s
itua
tion
, go
ver
nm
ent
cap
acit
y, c
oor
din
atio
n)
5
P
hy
si
ca
l e
nv
ir
on
m
en
t
(I
nf
ra
st
ru
ct
ur
e,
 g
eo
gr
ap
hy
,
cl
im
at
e,
 n
at
ur
al
 h
az
ar
ds
)
2
D
em
og
ra
ph
y
13
Availability
and adequacy 
of shelter
12
Food security
8
Morbidity
9
Nutritional status
7
Mortality
11
Access to and
performance 
of the health
system,
nutrition and
psychosocial
services
10
Access to
improved
water sources
and 
sanitation
15
Capacities and vulnerabilities analysis
(e.g gender, including age and gender disaggregation)
Participation
6A report for WFP
There is a trend among UN agencies to conduct joint
Emergency Needs Assessments, with the goal of
identifying the ‘basket’ of inter-related sectoral needs in
response to a humanitarian crisis. While ultimately
desirable for coordinated planning across many sectors
(see CAP NAF Guidelines, April 2005), there are analytical
drawbacks to such an ‘all-in-one’ assessment approach, in
that it can dilute the methodological rigour of any
particular sectoral analysis (i.e. different sectors usually
require distinct methods, timelines and expertise). The
ODI report According to Need? (Darcy and Hofmann, 2003),
recommended closely coordinated but distinct sectoral
assessments to ensure the technical integrity of individual
sectors, as well as maximum coordination.
Particularly in the context of protracted emergencies, EFSA
should not be considered in isolation, but should be seen
as part of a broader food security information and analysis
system. Such a system has a number of precursor and
follow-up components to the EFSA process itself (Table 2).
The precursor components add technical rigour and
efficiency to the EFSA, whereas the follow-up components
link EFSA to programme implementation, including
design, advocacy and exit criteria.2 While the this study
focuses on the EFSA component, where relevant it also
examines links with other components.
As Darcy and Hofmann point out (2003), assessment
should be considered an ongoing process, not simply a
front-loaded activity designed to justify funding proposals
and determine the number of intended beneficiaries. This
is particularly true in protracted situations, where there is
a tendency (as in Ethiopia) to determine needs on the basis
of previous estimates of ‘numbers affected’. Situations
change and the food insecurity profile may look very
different from one period to the next.
2 Drawing on the work of Watkins and Maxwell (2003), among others, the Food
Security Analysis Unit for Somalia (FSAU) has developed a Food Security
Analysis System (FSAS) that articulates the inter-linkages between core
analytical components, as opposed to a more linear approach, as outlined in
Table 2, FSAU Technical Series (November 2004).
Component Frequency of analysis Information categories/questions addressed
1. Baseline vulnerability Infrequent (every 5 years, or What are the basic livelihoods of groups?
and poverty assessment when context changes) What are known or likely hazards: natural, environmental, social, 
economic political? 
What indicators should be monitored? 
Who are the most vulnerable groups?
2. Early Warning Continuous Indicator trend analysis: is there a problem developing? 
Where and how quickly is it developing? 
What are its geographic dimensions?
Where would an in-depth assessment(s) be concentrated?
3. Emergency Food As needed – regular and/ What is the nature and what are the dimensions of the problem?
Security Assessment or ad hoc How long is it going to last?
Who are the most vulnerable groups? 
What and how much is needed: what is the best response? 
Programmatic interventions (based on information generated, but not part of information system, per se
4. Impact Evaluation Regular intervals (while  Is the intervention achieving the intended result? 
programme is ongoing) What adjustments are necessary (response, quantity, targeting)? 
5. Context Monitoring Continuous What are the possibilities for exit, recovery or transition for 
longer-term responses? 
6. Programme evaluation  Periodic How can the overall programme (information system, preparedness,
and lessons learned response) be improved? 
Are programmes upholding humanitarian principles? 
Source: Maxwell and Watkins, 2003
Table 2: Position of EFSA within humanitarian/food security information systems 
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2.1 Livelihood complexity
Ethiopia is one of the poorest counties in the world,
requiring continuously high levels of humanitarian and
development assistance. It is also remarkable in its
livelihood and political complexity: a function of diverse
human and physical geography and a long history of a
strong central authority. These factors have direct bearing
on the design and technical rigour of EFSAs.
Ethiopia’s poverty and vulnerability to food insecurity make
it a place of recurrent emergencies. An estimated 5–6m
people are considered chronically food insecure – that is,
they require some type of resource transfer (traditionally
food aid) to meet their minimal food requirements every
year. In recent years, between 2m and 7m additional people
have been deemed to be transitorily food insecure – that is,
slipping into and out of a need for food assistance. The
distinction between chronic and acute food insecurity – the
inability to meet food needs in the short term – remains
problematic (see below). In recent years, notable emergency
conditions have prevailed in parts of Tigray, Amhara,
Oromiya, Afar, the Southern Nations Nationalities and
People’s Region (SNNPR) and Somali.This covers six of the
country’s nine regions, and the majority of its population.
Ethiopia has the second largest population in Africa,
estimated at 72m people in 2004 (UNDP, 2003), and
ranks 169th of 175 countries in the Human Development
Index.3 Per capita gross domestic product (GDP)
purchasing power parity is $810, one of the lowest in the
world and less than half the average of $1,831 for sub-
Saharan Africa (UN HDR, 2004). An estimated 44% of the
population are undernourished, with 47% of children
under five underweight, and 52% stunted.
Chapter 2
Complex livelihood and political contexts with
extreme food insecurity
Map 1: Map of Ethiopia (Administrative Regions)
3  It is 139th out of 144 in the UNDP gender-related development index.
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Ethiopia is a large country, geographically and by
population size, and is extremely complex in terms of the
diversity of rural livelihoods. The vast majority of the
population, over 80%, live in rural areas (UNDP, 2003),
and agriculture accounts for 45% of GDP.Altitude variation
is extreme and there are two major weather systems,
giving rise to multiple seasonal cycles in different parts of
the country. Altitude varies between 125m above sea level
and 4,620m, with significant landmass and populations at
different levels. The seasons in Ethiopia are determined by
the ITCZ (Inter-Tropical Convergence Zone), which comes
in from the west and ultimately covers the north-west
third of the country, and the Indian Ocean system, which
moves in from the south-east and eventually covers the
south-east third. Maps 2 and 3 indicate the two weather
systems and the relationship between altitude and rainfall.
Understanding seasonality and rural livelihoods in Ethiopia is
critical to interpreting events and indicators and planning for
assessments and responses. It is also a major undertaking.
Recent efforts have attempted to do this on a sub-national
scale – livelihood mapping exercises have been conduced for
Somali region4 and SNNPR,5 and give some indication of the
contextual complexity.The map in Annex 4 provides such an
example, for SNNPR, where each zone represents easily dis-
tinguishable livelihood patterns, based on types of crops
grown and livestock owned, and seasonal patterns of eco-
nomic activities.6 See also Box 1 for a brief description of
three livelihood zones, and the food security-related issues
they face.
As a result of the climatic variation, a wide variety of
crops is grown in Ethiopia, including staples such as
barley, wheat, teff, maize, sorghum, enset, potatoes and
other tubers.7 In addition, pulses are widely grown, and
a variety of fruit and vegetables is found in many areas.
Ethiopia is one of the world’s largest producers of high-
quality Arabica coffee, with approximately 700,000
smallholders producing the vast majority, and providing
Map 2: The geographic limits of different rainfall systems in Ethiopia
4  As part of the development of an early warning system for the region, through
SC UK and DPPC, initiated in 2001.
5  Ongoing at present, supported by USAID and FEWS NET, with the DPPC.
6 The livelihood mapping indicated here is based on the HEA approach. One
limitation of HEA-based mapping is that it is typically a function of
geography and household economy and is weak at bringing out politically-
related vulnerability.There is a wealth of different livelihood-related research
on Ethiopia, e.g. Rahmato, D. and Y. Amared. See Lautze et al. (2003) for a
comprehensive reference.
7 Enset is also known as false banana. Enset and tuber production are not
recorded in the CFSAM, although these are important staple food sources
for significant numbers of people. Failure to monitor such crops results
in failure to anticipate or follow deteriorating food security for such
farmers.
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work for many others.8 Chat is an increasingly important
smallholder cash crop in certain areas. There are also
many different patterns of population migration, both
amongst traditionally mobile populations such as
pastoralists, and among many highland farming
communities, where seasonal migration for labour is a
critical livelihood strategy. In general, farming house-
holds in Ethiopia have small landholdings, and crops are
almost entirely rain-fed.
Livestock accounts for over 20% of GDP, and is critical for
farming and pastoral communities (EC/IGAD, 2000,
quoted in Lautze et al., 2003), and is a major indicator of
wealth for most rural communities. Major livestock species
include cattle, camel, horses, donkeys, mules, sheep, goats
and chickens. Pastoralists and agro-pastoralists are a
significant population group. They have also been
historically marginalised and excluded from power and
access to state resources. They are found in many of the
outlying, lowland areas of the country, such as Somali and
Afar regions and Borena and South Omo zones, politically
sensitive areas where Ethiopia borders Eritrea, Djibouti,
Somalia, Kenya and Sudan.
The implications of this diversity for EFSA include a) the
appropriate timing for assessments; b) the difficulties of
interpreting data and information; c) the scale of developing
a (standardised) baseline or reference understanding of local
livelihoods; d) the variety of indicators/data/information
required to understand the different groups; and e) the
variety of food security issues facing the different groups.
The hawd is known for its lack of permanent water sources
and reliance on livestock sales exported to the Gulf, through
northern Somalia. Commonly consumed foodstuffs, such as
pasta, rice, sorghum and maize, are imported through
Somalia. Local marketing opportunities for meat and milk
sales are poor, given the lack of significant urban
settlements.The Somali shilling is a more common currency
than the Ethiopian Birr.
Wealthier households have more livestock than poorer
households, and in some areas own birkas,9 from which
they can sell water in dry seasons. Due to the lack of milk
marketing opportunities, milk consumption meets about
half of annual food needs for the wealthier two groups,
and about a quarter for poorer households. Remaining
food needs are met through purchases from the proceeds
Map 3: The relationship between altitude and rainfall
8 This sector has been hard-hit in recent years by the collapse in price of coffee
in the global market, but this factor is not well incorporated into food security
assessment systems. 9 Concrete-lined, sunken, household water reservoirs fed by run-off rainwater.
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of livestock sales. Poorer households, due to their relatively
small livestock numbers, have to supplement livestock-relat-
ed income by working, which may include collecting bush
products (firewood and wild foods), birka-related watering
and maintenance and petty trade, as well as by receiving
social gifts from wealthier households.
As a historically marginalised and neglected area, Somali
region suffers from poor government capacity and a severe
lack of public services such as health (human and livestock)
and education, and is prone to periods of insecurity.
This population group, after several poor rainfall years in
the late 1990s and early 2000s combined with economic
factors such as a livestock ban in the Gulf, has faced very
difficult times.
Related to the complexity and fragility of livelihoods noted
above is the fact that Ethiopia has extremely high levels of
malnutrition.The Millennium Development Goals on hunger
are measured by malnutrition rates, and nutrition underpins
six of the MDGs – reducing hunger, gender inequality, child
mortality and disease, and improving education and maternal
health. The very high prevalence of HIV/AIDS also has a
significant bearing on nutritional status and household food
security, particularly given the resulting shifts in dependency
ratios. While the links between nutrition, health, food
security and poverty have long been known, these links are
only now beginning to be made in information systems and
reflected in assessment practice. Aiming to achieve a sub-
stantial reduction in levels of acute and chronic malnutrition
provides the basis for establishing positive goals (short and
long term) for food security interventions in Ethiopia.
Box 1: Livelihood diversity in Ethiopia – some
examples
Highland belg-dependent farmers. One of the areas in receipt
of food aid for many years, and considered chronically food
insecure, is the highland belg-dependent zone of North
Wollo.10 At an altitude of 2,000–3,500m, with the major
harvest after the minor belg rains, the dominant crop is barley,
with wheat, oats, pulses and flax also common, as well as
cows, oxen and sheep. Many different kinds of crop and
livestock sharing arrangements are practiced.11 Landholdings
are small, between 0.5 and 1ha of agricultural land and 0.05ha
of grazing land. The number of landless is increasing,12 and
land degradation is common.
The population can be divided into four groups. The so-called
middle and richer groups have small numbers of cows and
oxen, and often rent out land to poorer groups. The poorest
group includes very small landholders, new couples, returnees
and the displaced, as well as the disabled and the elderly. 
Poorer groups are dependent on food aid to meet between two
and four months of their needs, even in ‘normal’ or ‘non-
drought’ years,13 although it is common that aid does not
arrive at the most appropriate time. Both groups have to
purchase at least one-third of their remaining food
requirements, in addition to what they grow. The major income
source for these two groups is seasonal labour in the maize-
and sorghum-producing lowlands, between January and May,
although contracting malaria or HIV/AIDS is a recognised risk
of doing this. In theory, public works projects could be making
a contribution to addressing some of the underlying causes of
people’s food insecurity.14
Jimma coffee and maize farmers.15 The mid-highland areas of
Goma woreda, Oromiya region, are not traditionally
considered food insecure. However, livelihoods have been
eroded in recent years as the price of coffee has fallen. 
Rainfall varies between 1,200 and 2,400mm per year here, with
a long rainy season from February/March to October/
November. Coffee and maize are the dominant crops and the
most important contributors to household food and income,
with sorghum, teff, wheat, barley, pulses, chat and oil crops also
grown. 
Wealthier households tend to have more land and livestock
(1–2 oxen and 1–2 cows) than poorer households, who have
less or no land (newly married couples with no land are
particularly notable) and few animals, and rely heavily on a
variety of seasonal employment activities, especially picking
and processing coffee.
In 2003, these farmers complained about their third
consecutive ‘bad year’, due to low coffee prices and poor
cereal production. Research shows that their disposable
income had fallen by 40% between 2000 and 2003. As well
as facing lower cereal production and coffee prices, many
were having to cope with the effects of the restructuring of
the coffee marketing system as the Ethiopian economy
moves towards a market-based system. Farmers find it
difficult to switch to other crops given their long history with
coffee and the lack of other obvious marketable choices,
except chat.
Somali region pastoralists. The Warder pastoral livelihood
group covers a very large geographic area, incorporating the
hawd area of Somali region, which extends into north-west
(Somaliland) and north-east (Puntland) Somalia. Management
of camels and shoats dominate local livelihoods.
10 Includes the higher-altitude areas of Delanta Dwent, Meket, Gubalafto, Gidan
and Wadla woredas.
11 Many different relationships are formed, particularly between the poorer and
richer segments of society, in order to combine oxen, labour and other
agricultural inputs, or gain access to, for example, milking animals.
12 New couples may only get enough land for their homestead plot.
13 SC UK (2000); Sharp et al. (2003).
14 Looking at the impact of those projects is beyond the remit of this study.
15 This example is given to illustrate some of the problems faced by coffee
farmers, some of whom, in neighbouring SNNPR, were initially missed in the
2003 crisis, partially due to the lack of monitoring of the impact of lower
coffee prices.
2.2 Political complexity
The Ethiopian political landscape has been shaped by a long
history of rule by a small number of elites. Following the
overthrow of the Emperor, Haile Selassie, the country was
ruled from 1974 to 1991 by the Derg, which imposed a
centralised Marxist–Leninist system of government,
including a prolonged period of state terror (Lister, 2004).
The current ruling coalition, the Ethiopian People’s
Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), took power after
a transitional period following the military overthrow of
the Derg in 1991.The Ethiopian and Eritrean governments
fought a war over a border disagreement in 1998–99.
Various commentators have described the workings of the
government as opaque (Lister, 2004). Although many GoE
policy and strategic documents embrace principles of
transparent and more participatory governance, in reality
such ‘opening up’ is open to question (Lister, 2004).16 As
may be expected in a tightly controlled political environ-
ment, the potential for politicising information is great
(Sandford, 2002).
Ethiopia’s geopolitical position, combined with US
President George W. Bush’s declaration of ‘no famine on
my watch’, ensures that Ethiopia continues to receive
significant amounts of overseas development assistance, in
particular from the US government (see Figure 2).
However, given the population size and the needs of the
country, ODA is relatively low, averaging $13/person/year
in 1998–2002, compared with $23 for sub-Saharan Africa
as a whole, and $21 for least-developed countries. Of that,
the humanitarian and relief sector dominates all other
individual sectors, averaging $282m/year, of which the
vast majority has been food aid. In an ‘emergency’ year, the
share may jump to about half of ODA (UNDP, 2003).
Ethiopia has been undergoing a structural transformation
in recent years, one of the main components of which has
been the decentralisation of political and administrative
structures. In principle, this is seen as a positive
development given the size of the population and its
poverty and diversity. However, given the country’s history
of central control, empowering and building the capacity
of regions is an enormous undertaking.
The UN Country Team is currently exploring the potential
for its own decentralisation, alongside the government’s
(UNDAF/personal communication with UN Resident
Representative). Several initiatives to improve early
warning and emergency needs analysis are currently
region-based.
2.3 Food security issues in Ethiopia: a review
Ethiopia has a long history of famine and near-famine
conditions – most recently in 2002–2003 – and remains
extremely poor. The distribution of large amounts of food
aid over the years is one result of these two facts –
700,000MT/year on average over the last 15 years. Famine
and food insecurity have been most concentrated in
Amhara and Tigray regions.
Improving food security is recognised within the
Sustainable Development Poverty Reduction Paper
(SDPRP) as a central concern of government. The poverty
reduction strategy has ‘agricultural development-led
industrialisation and food security’ as one of its four key
pillars or building-blocks.17 Food security programmes are
acknowledged to be a ‘subset of poverty reduction
11
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16 The May 2005 election is an interesting juncture in the nature and evolution
of democracy in Ethiopia.
17 The other three are Justice and Civil Service Reform; Governance,
Decentralisation and Empowerment; and Capacity Building.
Figure 2: Average share of ODA from the ten largest
bilateral donors 1997–2002
Figure 3: Sectoral share of ODA, 1997–2002 
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interventions’. The food security strategy in turn claims to
address the ‘supply and demand side’, at national and house-
hold level, ‘taking into account the diversity of the national
economy’.The three pillars of the strategy are: increasing the
availability of food through domestic (own) production;
ensuring access to food for food-deficit households; and
strengthening emergency response capability.
The conceptualisation of food insecurity and poverty in
Ethiopia is described in Figure 4.
Food Security Programme, Vol. 1
The New Coalition on Food Security in Ethiopia (NCFSE)18
identifies the following as key constraints in food
insecurity:
• Recurring drought
• Limited sources of alternative incomes
• Population pressure
• Limitations in technology
• Lack of product diversification and market integration 
• Limited capacity in planning and implementation
• Environmental degradation
• Limited access to credit
While the language of the SDPRP and the ‘diagrammatic’
depiction of food security constraints appear to be based on
sound principles, actual EFSA practice suggests that the
details of problem analysis and the operationalisation of the
conceptual framework have major weaknesses. In terms of
the development of government policies, Teshome points
out that ‘there is a general lack of systematic problem
diagnosis/identification in Ethiopia’ (Teshome, 2002: 5).
The Joint Partner Review of the Ethiopia SDPRP additionally
comments that ‘government and donor policies commonly
suffer from a “missing middle” … a lack of clear linkage
between analysis and policy choice’ (DAG, 2003: 4).
While emphasis is given to the demand, household and
access side of the food security equation in the above
policy documents – to complement the supply, national
and availability side – there is limited evidence that an
improved understanding of household food access and
local livelihoods is reaching the food security community
in Ethiopia in a practical sense. This is discussed further
below.
Figure 4: The problem of food security in Ethiopia
18 The Food Security Coalition claims to reflect a new partnership among
government, development partners (donors, UN, NGOs, etc.), civil society,
and the private sector and involving the social mobilisation of the people
themselves; it builds on the PRSP/SDPRP. Commentators have noted how the
formation of the NCFSE and its work was the fortunate result of a relatively
short burst of energy after the last major emergency and before staff turnover
and the next big emergency got in the way.
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2.3.1 Emergency needs and safety nets
In the last couple of years a major programmatic shift has
been taking place in Ethiopia concerning food security.
This is based on the development of the Productive Safety
Net Programme (PSNP). The PSNP is framed within the
Food Security Programme, a recent initiative of the NCFSE.
The stated rationale for the PSNP is to address the food needs
of the chronically food insecure through multi-year
predictable resources, rather than through a system
dominated by emergency humanitarian aid. Crucially, this
involves a shift from food to cash as the primary input (PSNP
PIM, 2004). The programme is in its first year of
implementation, and is strongly supported in principle by
both donors and the government. The idea is that cash is a
more flexible resource for households, and may act as an
incentive for increased agricultural production by increasing
demand. A multi-year cycle also ‘buys time’ to better plan
appropriate interventions for this group, and thereby breaks
the cyclical emergency appeal process and potential
dependence on food aid.
The development of the PSNP has also created a new arm of
the government, the Food Security Coordination Bureau
(FSCB), whose mandate is to manage the PSNP. Previously,
the Disaster Preparedness and Prevention Commission
(DPPC) had managed the entire food insecure caseload (the
DPPC remains responsible for early warning, emergency
needs assessments and emergency response coordination).
This separation of roles is creating some instability and
uncertainty, for the DPPC in particular. The influence
associated with managing food aid is shifting away from the
DPPC, and the Prime Minister has declared that he wants
Ethiopia out of the food aid/emergency ‘business’ within the
next five years.
Concerns have also been raised about the speed with which
the PSNP has been adopted and the scale on which it is to
be implemented, and therefore the human and systems
capacity required (interview, Sandford).19 Notably, however,
there has been little or no serious analysis of who the
chronically food insecure are, and why they are in such a
position. Some suggest that such analysis has in fact been
done by regional government.20 Others argue, pragmatically,
that making this programmatic shift was a necessary first
step, and that the analytical component can be developed
later. In any case, there remains much uncertainty
surrounding chronic food insecurity.
2.3.2 The institutionalisation and political economy of
food aid 
Years of receiving very large quantities of food aid have led
to the institutionalisation of food aid-related processes and
mechanisms in Ethiopia, of which the ENA is one.Various
incentives for different actors may serve to perpetuate the
status quo. The monetary value of food aid includes large
international and national transport costs paid to private
transport companies.21 The scope for using and abusing
food aid is inevitably large. Commenting on the multi-
agency assessments in particular, Lautze et al. highlight that
‘these exercises can be vulnerable to political influence at
all levels’, and thus can lead to potential abuses of
humanitarian assistance (Lautze et al., 2003: 53).
Research on food aid targeting in Ethiopia in 1997 highlights
the risk that, as ‘institutional capacity’ in the food aid distri-
bution system develops over time, such investment creates a
strong incentive to maintain food aid regardless of needs
(Clay et al., 1997). Devereux (2005) asks why, after the emer-
gency of 2000 in Somali region,‘needs’ (and by impli-cation
food aid distributions) have stayed so high, particularly when
targeting in Somali region is poor. This study suggests that
one answer lies in the inability of the ENA process to take due
account of other possible mitigation strategies.
Figure 5: People needing food aid, Somali Region
The implications of these various factors for improving
EFSA include: (1) given the central role of GoE, technical
improve-ments cannot be decoupled from GoE
institutional structures and development strategies; (2)
the current period of rapid transition within the GoE
(including elections and emerging new institutions such
as the FSCB) requires awareness of shifting roles and
centres of power; (3) the long history of massive
humanitarian assistance creates both institutional and
conceptual inertia that can limit change; and (4)
incentives to continue current practices, as well as
disincentives to change, may exist within donors, contrac-
tors, agencies and national and sub-national government.
Identifying and addressing these factors may be essential
to progress.
19 Recent reports highlight the government’s own acknowledgement of delays
in implementation due to its lack of experience with the new modalities, as
well as earlier donor delays in funding (IRIN, 29 June 2005).
20 If so, this information is not widely known or available.
21 For example, the latest WFP PRRO, valued at around $780m, indicates that
approximately half of the overall budget accounts for the value of the food
itself and half for the cost of international and national transport and
associated expenses.
1,600,000
1,400,000
1,200,000
1,000,000
800,000
600,000
400,000
200,000
0
Population
95    96    97    98     99    00    01    02     03     04
Source: Devereux (2005) from DPPC (2003)
2.4 The role of WFP in food security in Ethiopia
Figure 6 shows the economic importance of food aid, and
the upward trend in food aid distributions. Both factors
place WFP firmly at the centre of issues concerning food
security. WFP is an actor in the development field22 as well
as in emergencies, and therefore its power and
responsibility in terms of improving food security analysis
and processes should not be underplayed.
The value of the most recent PRRO for Ethiopia
(2005–2007) is about $780m, for 1.4m MT of food aid, of
which approximately half is the value of the food itself.23
This must make WFP one of the single largest economic
entities in the country outside of the government.
With an emphasis on food aid distribution, WFP clearly
plays a major role in food security, handling 30–40% of
national food distributions.The government and national
and international NGOs handle the remainder.Within the
Early Warning Working Group (EWWG) and the ENA
process, WFP is the largest contributor in terms of
logistics support, and contributes significantly in terms
of human resources. WFP has also played an important
and positive role in the safety nets programme, based on
its general and development programme experience.
Through the Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping (VAM)
office, WFP has at various times acted as a centre for
information exchange and analysis, and has been an
important player in attempts to improve the ENA
methodology.
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Figure 6: Food aid appeals and distributions
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22 For example, the MERET (Managing Environmental Resources to Enable
Transition to more Sustainable Livelihoods) programme aims to ‘identify and
react to some of the root causes of food shortages … and … generate assets and
food security options for the rural people of Ethiopia’.
23 The majority of the remainder will be accounted for by international and in-
country transportation costs. Direct operating costs for WFP, out of the PRRO,
are just under $12m a year.
Sources: WFP, non-WFP and Total assistance: WFP, INTERFAIS (2005); Appeals: Devereux (2005) from DPPC (2003).
3.1 The evolution of EFSA in Ethiopia
The history of EFSA-related activities, such as early warning,
crop assessments and nutrition surveillance, goes back to the
1970s and 1980s, and the major famines in each of those
decades. While under development, the systems focused on
areas known to be most vulnerable to food insecurity, i.e.
where famines were known to have occurred. Annex 1 des-
cribes changes in food security-related theory and practice,
with reference to Ethiopia. Broadly speaking, this shows a
move away from an exclusive focus on food supply to a
greater concern with food access and (latterly) with liveli-
hoods and the factors underlying household poverty.
By the mid-1990s, government and non-government actors
were doing their own assessments. In 1993, a National Policy
on Disaster Preparedness and Management was developed,
and the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission became the
Disaster Preparedness and Prevention Commission (DPPC).
In 1996, the EWWG was formed in order to harmonise
assessments under the DPPC (see Annex 2 for a chronology
of methodological discussions within the EWWG, and Annex
3 for a summary of key developments in relation to metho-
dological issues).
The methodology sub-group of the EWWG, formed soon
after the EWWG itself, has been a hive of activity on this
subject ever since; its participants have gone through
different cycles of discussion, disagreement, agreement
and piloting. The following is a summary of the agencies
involved in trying to improve the EFSA in recent years:
• SC UK – development of RiskMap programme in the
mid/late 1990s, based on the Household Economy
Approach (HEA).
• UNDP – development of the current early warning and
needs assessment system, through a technical
secondment to DPPC, in the mid/late 1990s (with WFP).
• WFP – consultant hired to work with the EWWG to
improve the EFSA methodology, in 2001/02.
• SC UK – consultant hired to continue work of previous
WFP consultant, through the EWWG, in 2003/04.
• FEWS NET – current and ongoing initiative building on
work of previous SC UK consultant, through the DPPC.
The underlying orthodoxy in Ethiopia has been
explained as a ‘food-first bias’ linked to the use of a ‘food
availability decline’ model for food security analysis
(Lautze et al., 2003).24 This has its roots in the prevailing
understanding of food security in the 1970s and early
1980s.
While the safety net programme, the increasing inclusion
of ‘non-food’ items in the Humanitarian Appeal and
current initiatives to improve early warning and EFSA
reflect a significant change in the thinking and practice
related to food security, it is still unclear whether these
initiatives will transform the means of analysis and EFSA
practice. They do, however, offer significant opport-
unities.
3.2 Current practice of EFSA in Ethiopia
The EFSA process is organised through the EWWG. The
EWWG is chaired by the DPPC, and has FEWS NET as its
15
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24 Lautze et al. (2003) argues that ‘leading humanitarian agencies in Ethiopia
theorize famine as the outcome of food shortages leading to starvation.
Termed a “food first bias”, this has been the prevailing model of famine
theory in Ethiopia since the 1970s’.
Chapter 3
Overview of current EFSA practice 
Box 2: The typical EFSA process 
The EWWG decides the dates for the assessment and seeks
financial and human resources to run the exercise. The
Methodology sub-group prepares background materials and
reviews, and revises the existing checklist/reporting format.
Team leaders and team members are identified, and half-day
briefings of the assessment approach and relevant materials
are organised in Addis Ababa and in regional capitals. 
At the regional level, zones and woredas to visit are identified,
based on simple criteria and available time, and discussions
and field visits are undertaken to zones, woredas and kebeles
– field observations and discussions with communities and
government staff are undertaken, using the guideline/
checklist. Reports are prepared at the zonal level by the teams
and presented to regional governments for further discussion
and then dissemination to the federal level.
Assessment guidelines25 include the following: objectives and
terms of reference for the assessment; various suggestions and
reminders regarding good practice (e.g. to conduct regular
team briefings and debriefings, to compare the current
situation with seasonal norms, to get a balance of worst and
lesser-affected areas, so as not to ask leading questions; to
consider factors such as rainfall, crop production, pasture,
livestock production, water conditions, market conditions; to
follow the ‘thought process for relief eligibility consideration’).
Quantitative information to be collected includes estimates
of needy population, crop area and production, market
prices and livestock numbers, for which tables are provided.
A reporting format is provided and reports, with beneficiary
figures, are compiled at zonal level and forwarded to regional
and federal levels for finalisation. 
25 These run to about 25 pages.
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secretary.26 The EWWG has various sub-groups. The
Methodology sub-group is the forum through which
methodological issues are raised and discussed. It also
prepares background material for assessments.27 
Three to four government-led, multi-agency assessments are
carried out each year.The main assessment takes place in late
November/early December, after the main meher rains. An
assessment after the smaller belg rains is also common, and
mid-season assessments may also take place.The main assess-
ment typically takes 20 days and involves up to 20 teams of
several people, with contributions from government
ministries, NGOs, UN organisations and donors.The assess-
ment is a major logistical effort, with the mobilisation of the
assessment teams and visits and meetings to all regions and
selected zones, woredas and kebeles.
The process has been described in the following terms:
In summary, each team visits a large number of weredas and the
majority of time is spent in discussions with wereda officials.The
topics covered in these discussions include: land,population,crops,
rainfall, production prospects and constraints, livestock condition,
prices, additional food and cash income sources, human health,
education and relief (many of these topics are disaggregated by
agro-ecological zone).Discussions with farmers and community
members and direct observation of crop conditions are secondary
components of the assessment (SC UK, 2004).
Following discussions and fieldwork, the team develops a
qualitative rating of current conditions for each of seven
income sources (cash and food): crop production, livestock
production, wage labour, petty trade, petty commodity
production, wild food and remittances. The ratings are on a
scale of 1–5, with 1 representing ‘much better than normal’,
3 ‘normal’ and 5 ‘much worse than normal’.A final rating for
the woreda as a whole is calculated as a weighted average of the
seven individual ratings. In order to calculate needs (bene-
ficiary numbers and duration), team members compare the
current woreda rating with previous years’ ratings, and refer to
historical data on beneficiary numbers and food aid
distributed (SC UK, 2004).
In practice, it appears to be common knowledge that there
is no standard approach or method. A number of different
means are used to calculate beneficiary numbers28 and, in
some cases, the team spends a large amount of time
negotiating beneficiary numbers with woreda officials (ibid.;
Sandford, unpublished).
3.3 Recent initiatives to improve EFSA 
The current official early warning and EFSA system is based
on work done in the mid/late 1990s through the UNDP
secondment mentioned above, with the support of WFP.The
system is indicator-based: indicators are weighted according
to local relevance. It is designed to collect data in order to
prioritise woredas affected by food insecurity, and involves the
use of analytical software to facilitate analysis.
The current system is not fully operational.A USAID-funded
retrospective analysis of the 2002/03 crisis indicates that the
current early warning system ‘relies on climatic and crop
production indicators’, is ‘overly complex’ and is ‘essentially
not operational’ (Anderson and Choularton, 2004: 10). In
practice, assessments are based to a large extent on ad hoc
observations and intuition, complemented by rainfall and
crop production forecasts. As the report states: ‘assessments
dominate the food security early warning process … and
cereal production dominates needs assessments’. There is
strong government ownership of this system, and it has
been difficult for the government to accept that it has not
worked. That said, the scale and transparency of the
Ethiopian system is in many ways remarkable. Given
enormous capacity constraints, the system involves a wide
range of stakeholders, from virtually all levels of govern-
ment, as well as international actors.
As the official system was being developed in the mid-1990s,
SC UK was developing the food economy methodology and
a complementary analytical software programme, RiskMap.
This difference in methods became the subject of serious
personality and institutional clashes, the legacy of which is
still felt today. In more recent years, particularly from 2000,
the methodology sub-group of the EWWG has been through
a much more collaborative and constructive period of
discussion, problem identification and piloting of new
methods. As a result, many of the weaknesses of the current
system are well known, at least to a more technically-minded
audience. The major issues that have been raised, and
initiatives implemented as a result, are summarised below
(K. Hedlund, private communication; Chapman, 2005):
• In 2000, WFP introduced a questionnaire that
attempted to standardise the method for calculating
beneficiaries. This consisted of a qualitative assessment
of changes in major sources of income, translated into
a quantified percentage change in numbers affected. In
the absence of comprehensive baselines in all affected
communities, this percentage change was applied to
the historical average of beneficiary figures.
• In 2002, the WFP consultancy attempted to provide a
standard questionnaire that calculated the food gap
based on changes in household sources of income, and
proposed a sampling scheme based on livelihood
zones. The questionnaire was piloted but perceived
problems remained, including how to get reliable
26 Members include WFP, UNICEF, OCHA, MoA, MoH, CSA, FSCB, FEWS NET,
SC UK, CARE, Concern, ACF, EC, NMSA, EMA, WV, CIDA 
27 Chaired by DPPC, core members/contributors are WFP, FEWS NET, SC UK
and MoA 
28 Some examples of methods:
a) the number of people the planned harvest yield should feed – the number of
people the actual yield should feed = the number of beneficiaries;
b) same as (a) but with an adjustment for ‘coping mechanisms’;
c) harvest-dependent population – the number of people this year’s expected
actual yield will feed equals the number of beneficiaries, plus an adjustment
for other income sources.
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information from the field.The EWWG, including WFP,
did not recommend the questionnaire for use, but all
involved recognised the importance of the process in
helping to identify specific areas of concern.
• Also in 2002, a series of discussions was held on
chronic versus transitory food insecurity. These discus-
sions included definitions and the issue of fluid
‘membership’ of these groups. The utility of defining
these groups in an emergency needs assessment was
contrasted with the utility of defining these groups in
relation to the type of intervention being proposed.
• In 2003, SC UK hired a consultant from the Food
Economy Group to address the concerns raised through
the work of the WFP consultant and through the EWWG
in general.29 As a result, a package of assess-ment training
and guideline materials was developed and piloted.
• Between 2003 and 2005, the WFP VAM unit attempted
to introduce more quantitative tools to enable teams to
reach a more objective assessment of food security and
to address the issue of capacity-building.These tools in-
cluded a Pictorial Evaluation Tool used during the meher
assessment in 2004, and a ‘hotspot’ list (based on EW
indicators collected throughout the year) to determine
the sites to be visited during the belg assessment in
2005.
The major technical issues of concern over recent years
have generally been in the following areas (Chapman,
2005; Sandford, 2002):
• Sampling biases and geographic coverage.
• Obtaining information from households and commun-
ities (as well as government officials) with a reasonable
degree of rigour.
• Triangulation/reliability of findings.
• Too much emphasis on cereal production, rather than
capturing all relevant food, income and coping strategy
information.
• How to quantify change – with reference to what
baseline information and by percentage or in absolute
quantities.
• The balance between qualitative and quantitative
information.
• Converting qualitative and quantitative data into bene-
ficiary numbers and food aid needs.
• The distinction between chronic and transitory food
insecurity.
The major political and institutional issues of relevance
include:
• Training sufficient staff.
• Using methods appropriate to the capacity of partici-
pants.
• Political and institutional will to make changes and use
evidence-based results.
In terms of specific EFSA methodological development, the
SC UK HEA-based system is the latest concerted effort, but
it has not yet been taken up officially.
Interviews with WFP, FEWS NET and SC UK staff who
participated in the piloting of the current HEA efforts
indicate a general consensus that these new tools and
techniques are an improvement over current needs
assessment practice, and addressed most of the concerns
raised through the EWWG. That said, EWWG members
highlight several concerns with HEA, especially when
considering its use on a large scale:
• The technical expertise required and the extent to
which the process can be automated.
• Investment in such a system needs to be judged against
an assurance that its analysis will be used.
• Quality control of data generated from community
focus groups.
The government has not given its endorsement. Reasons
given to the study team include:
• The DPPC regards the methodology as too complicated
and too time- and labour-intensive.30
• The SC UK focal point in the methodology sub-group
left, so the group lacked follow-up.
• In the Somali region piloting exercise, the method-
ology identified slightly lower levels of need than the
normal needs assessment process.
29 SC UK has been involved in early warning and needs assessments for many
years in Ethiopia, in Amhara and in Somali region, working closely with the
DPPC and attempting to demonstrate the utility of HEA as an appropriate
analytical framework and tool.
30 DPPC was interviewed in the study, although not directly questioned on the
reason for not taking up these newly developed tools.These are therefore the
views of the other participants in the pilot, who have either previously
worked for the DPPC and/or currently work closely with them. As
mentioned elsewhere, the timing of the study, close to the election and with
the uncertainty around the future of the DPPC and FSCB, made for difficult
interviewing conditions.
Box 3: Food aid: too little, or too much?
There is a common perception that any food security
assessment methodology will lead to lower estimates of
requirements for food aid. This is not necessarily the case –
SC UK analysis in Amhara region (SC UK, 2000) generated a
much higher estimated food/income gap than that reached
through the existing EFSA system. Another pilot exercise, in
Somali region, gave results that were very similar to those
reached using the usual method (interview with S.
Mohamed, SC UK). The common perception in the country,
including by the government at national level, is that food aid
needs are commonly inflated at lower levels. Clearly, where
there is no clear method, all of the above outcomes will occur
at different times, and in different places. 
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Although the tools developed have not yet been officially
endorsed, one of the outcomes of the process has been the
development and pilot-testing of a livelihood-based needs
assessment system in SNNPR Region.31
A related initiative is the commissioning of SC UK by the
Pastoral Community Development Project (a World Bank
project) to develop an early-warning system for pastoral
regions of the country – Somali, Afar, Borena zone
(Oromiya), S. Omo zone (SNNPR). This work is based on
the experience of SC UK in Ethiopia, particularly in Somali
region, and methodologically it is grounded in the HEA
approach. The immediate goal is not to conduct regular
(food) needs analysis, but rather to develop a community-
based early-warning monitoring system linked to
contingency planning and non-food responses. There is,
however, a close compatibility between this system and the
SNNPR system.
Another important initiative is the development of a
nutrition information system at the Emergency Nutrition
Coordination Unit of the DPPC. This will use bi-annual
nutrition screening data from the Emergency Outreach
Strategy programme.32 This work is led by UNICEF, in
collaboration with government ministries and WFP. As
part of the development of this programme, UNICEF and
DPPC are trying to involve the Ministries of Health and
Water much more closely, thereby widening the sectoral
understanding of, and responses to, the underlying causes
of malnutrition and food insecurity.33 Other develo-
pments under discussion include improving the
FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment methods,
and the EC’s attempts to improve the cereal market
information system.
While all of these developments intend to link with the
Food Security Programme and the NCFSE, there is a
notable and acknowledged lack of conceptual and practical
discussion of the linkages between these potentially
complementary components of an overall food security
and nutrition information and assessment system. Nor is it
clear that past lessons are being incorporated into project
and programme design.
31 This is funded by USAID, under the Emergency Preparedness Strengthening
Programme (EPSP), and implemented by FEWS NET, with the support of the
FEG, and the support and involvement of federal and regional DPPC.
32 EOS is described as a targeted large-scale child survival and nutrition
initiative, aimed at providing services to over 6.7 million under-fives in 325-
food insecure woredas.
33 The National Policy on Disaster Prevention and Management (NPDPM,
1993) has always indicated the appropriate involvement of other relevant
line ministries, coordinated through the DPPC, but this has only happened to
a limited extent in general (Chapman, 2005).
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4.1 General issues
On 4 May 2005, the international community and GoE
issued a joint Flash Appeal for an additional $48.3 million
on top of the previous Joint Humanitarian Appeal in January
2005 for $272 million, of which over 50% of resources
were for food aid. Among key analysts within the GoE, UN,
NGO and donor community, however, there were widely
differing perspectives on the severity of the situation and the
need for a flash appeal, which also extends to differing
explanations as to why the Flash Appeal was launched
(ranging from political to technical to institutional
motivations) – a reflection of the general lack of credibility
in current needs assessment practice in Ethiopia.
In contrast to widely acknowledged concerns with technical
rigour and credibility, however, reviews and evaluations have
highlighted the success of the early warning and needs
assessment system in terms of preventing widespread
famine (Lautze et al., 2003).This apparent success, however,
disguises flaws in the system with regard to problem
formation, the efficient targeting of resources and missed
opportunities to address food insecurity in a more holistic
manner. Most importantly, there has been a failure to take
adequate account of more localised food crises, and of the
general impoverishment and erosion of capacity that
recurrent crises have on the households affected.
This section offers an overview of the key problems in
EFSA practice, followed by a more detailed critical review
considering technical, institutional and planning issues.
Options for strengthening practice are identified within
each of these areas.
As previously noted, significant efforts have been made
over the years to improve the EFSA process within a very
complicated livelihood and political setting. The existence
of the EWWG, and the work of the Methodology sub-
group, particularly between 2000 and 2003, has been
instrumental in opening up the EFSA to critical review, and
piloting new methods. Many of the weaknesses of the
current system are well known among key actors.
There is still no uniform approach or method in practice.The
critique and recommendations set out here are therefore
aimed at a more general level, particularly in terms of the
processes that could lead to improvements, rather than
technical details concerning the different methods being
used.
The WFP consultant mentioned above summarised the
process as ‘a synthetic estimate of needs based on the
admixture of qualitative ratings and historical quantities’
(Riley, 2001). Limitations of the process as identified by
the Methodology group include:
• The large amount of time spent with woreda officials at
the expense of household and community-level
discussions.
• The fact that there is no single way to estimate bene-
ficiary needs from the qualitative woreda vulnerability
ratings, with the conclusion that the process is too
subjective.
• The reliance on historical quantities of assistance as a
reference point, rather than determining absolute current
needs.
• The lack of linkages between the needs assessments and
official baseline and monthly monitoring data (the
early-warning system).
• The timing of the assessment in the pre-harvest period,
when crop and livestock production for the following
period may not yet be clear.
• The focus on crop production at the expense of other
food and cash income sources (quoted in SC UK,
2004).
The task of improving the EFSA is as much, or indeed
more, a political decision than a technical one. Without
widespread recognition of the weaknesses of the current
system, and of the potential of a more integrated food
security information and assessment system, there is little
point in making minor adjustments to the current EFSA.
Given the scale of the EFSA, a major capacity-building
exercise, with high-level support, would be required to
change the practice of (emergency) food security
analysis.
FEWS NET and SC UK are seen as the driving forces for
change in EFSA-related food security analysis, offering
(and piloting with the government) an alternative
approach building on past experience. Regardless of the
merits of these two initiatives, other options are as yet not
forthcoming. There are, however, other related initiatives
that do not directly address the EFSA issue, but that can
certainly be complementary. The UNICEF Emergency
Outreach Strategy (EOS) nutrition screening programme is
one such; others include improvements to the Crop and
Food Supply Assessment Mission (CFSAM) and the
monitoring and evaluation system of the safety nets. What
is lacking in all of these initiatives is an operational
analytical framework and overall system design that places
these initiatives and actors within an overall system. This
offers a major opportunity for WFP.
Chapter 4
A critical review of current EFSA practice 
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4.2 Technical issues 
The DPPC guideline/checklist provides a broad range of
relevant food security factors and issues to consider and
gather information on, but does not constitute a workable
analytical framework or a methodology for helping the user
to identify food insecure populations.As a result, participants
are forced to discuss and negotiate around general inform-
ation and perceptions in order to come to a number or
numbers (of beneficiaries and food aid needs) using familiar
methods, e.g. a variety of local food balance calculations,
with limited reference to baseline and trend data/inform-
ation (Sandford, 2002; SC UK, 2004; interview with Z.
Ewnetu).
In addition, the current EFSA does not clearly position
itself within an overall, integrated Humanitarian/Food
Security Information and Assessment System (as described
in Table 2), linking baseline information to trend data and
emergency needs assessments (Chapman, 2005; Anderson
& Choularton, 2004). As the WFP consultant highlighted:
The EFNA would benefit enormously from prior, detailed
information on the local structure of livelihoods and local
vulnerabilities and capacities, including (a) seasonality of activi-
ties;(b) sources of food and income;(c) expenditure patterns;(d)
historical incidence of emergencies; (e) ‘normal’ levels of variabi-
lity of production, incomes and expenditures; (f) traditional
emergency coping behaviours, among others (Riley, 2001).
A focus on these two areas would give WFP an opportunity
to step back, and contribute to the basic design and funda-
mental aspects of an overall food security information and
assessment system.The basic components of such a system
can be described as:
• Baseline.
• EW/Outcome indicators.
• EFSA.
Baseline. There is a wealth of information on local food
security and livelihood patterns in Ethiopia, the result of
research by a wide range of actors. Not all of this inform-
ation is comparable, but it certainly appears to be under-
utilised. However, as indicated by Riley, the range of useful
information would include:
• Distinct livelihood or economic groups.
• Exposure to shocks or hazards.
• Political factors that affect vulnerability.
• Population information by livelihood or economic group.
• Crops grown, livestock accessed.
• A history of food security-related issues and conditions.
• An understanding of wealth within groups.
• Aspects of seasonality, as they determine crop, livestock
and other economic activities.
• Patterns of access to food and income, and expenditure.
• Coping strategies in bad years.
• Trend data – prices, terms of trade, production, yields,
giving parameters for ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ conditions.
Currently and coincidentally, two major ongoing initiatives
should develop consistent, comparable food security-relevant
livelihood baseline information (DPPC/PCDP/SC UK and
DPPC/FEWS NET) on a large-scale – regional and sub-
regional. Both initiatives are working through the
government, although they have slightly different purposes
and are working out means of coordination and harmoni-
sation.They provide an obvious means by which WFP could
enrich its baseline livelihood understanding.WFP could also
add to these HEA-based baselines by bringing other research
to deepen the analysis, and linking the findings to its own
woreda vulnerability profiles.
Useful products could include:
• Livelihood maps.
• Detailed livelihood profiles.
• Seasonal maps – with clear linkages to monitoring
systems.
Contributing and/or gaining access to such information
would have a number of uses:
• Identifying appropriate monitoring indicators.
• Helping to interpret indicator information.
• Contributing to identifying expected hazards/shocks.
• Contributing to identifying the underlying causes of
food insecurity and livelihood insecurity for different
livelihood groups.
EW and outcome indicators.The current official computer database
and analytical software of the DPPC is not functional
(Anderson and Choularton, 2004).
Box 4: The HEA livelihoods approach
By noting the recent methodological trends related to the
Household Economy Approach, this study is not endorsing HEA
above other approaches and methods, but suggesting the
current attention on methodological development presents a
major opportunity to develop standardised information and
understanding across a large area of Ethiopia.
By using this information, and possibly enriching it further, WFP
need not be committing itself to HEA as an analytical tool: HEA
can be reduced to different components: a) a foundation for
livelihood baseline information which can be utilised in many
ways; b) an approach for identifying and organising relevant
food security and livelihoods related information; c) a guide
based on its historical methods for information gathering –
PRA/RRA, semi-structured questionnaires, specific training;
and d) as an analytical tool for quantifying changes in access to
food and income. 
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There has been a tendency for early-warning systems in
Ethiopia and elsewhere to collect large amounts of trend
data with little analysis of the utility of the data. This may
also be the case for the current market price information
systems in Ethiopia.34 The possibility of reducing the
number of indicators to a minimum, manageable and
useful number is currently being raised (discussions with
FEWS NET/EPSP and SC UK).
Greater clarity is needed over the utility and reliability of
different indicator information. Some indicators are most
useful as early signs of impending problems, some as con-
firmation that a situation has deteriorated, and some as both.
EFSA practice. Current EFSA practice, although guided by the
DPPC’s agreed assessment guidelines, is not rigorous as it
does not follow a consistent methodology or analytical
framework. The system essentially uses qualitative judge-
ments and negotiation. The most obvious basis by which
figures are generated from year to year is to adjust them up
or down on the basis of whether expected or actual rainfall
and cereal production are better or worse than last year.
Rigour is a function of approach, method, triangulation
and consistency. It relates to the objectives set. Rigour does
not imply precision – there is a limit to the accuracy of
findings in information-poor environments, and there is
no point in providing more precise information than is
needed for the response.
Qualitative judgement and negotiations are not
intrinsically a problem, and may well serve to draw out
local knowledge from lower-level government officials,
but if information is not organised through an appropriate
conceptual frame-work and grounded in evidence from
the field, the process is based on very little but a few
individuals’ personal perceptions.
Technical rigour can also be strengthened by incorporating
statistically valid quantitative methods into the EFSA, such
as household and anthropometric surveys. While
potentially a daunting task over large areas and population
groups, at the least survey techniques could be utilised for
small areas, or as an intensive effort to establish a reference
understanding of vulnerability. In addition, a number of
national surveys (e.g. DHS, MICS and the national census)
offer opportunities to triangulate rapid assessment
information with more statistically valid data.
The starting point for improving technical rigour is to ack-
nowledge that different approaches and methods exist, and
that much of the data being used is of differing reliability
(Sandford, 2002). A common analytical framework and
approach could then be developed. Different methods and
information may be necessary for very different livelihood
groups, e.g. crop-dependent versus livestock-dependent.
4.3 Institutional issues for WFP
4.3.1 Funding and structure
Given Ethiopia’s size and complexity, and WFP’s size and
prominence as a leading agency in food security and
emergency needs assessment, adequate resources need to
be available to meet the continuous and complicated
demands for good-quality information.35
The nature of recurring emergencies over such a large and
complex country creates high and unpredictable demands
on staff time and energy.This is noted for the VAM unit in
particular, in Addis Ababa and in the field. Methodological
and technical development (as well as reliable information
collection and verification) need concerted time and con-
centration, and are very difficult in such an environment.
The VAM unit itself has changed considerably in recent
years, increasing from two staff in 2000 (one national, one
international) to its current complement of five (two
international, three national). There has also been a
significant turnover of staff, especially in the last six
months, with three experienced national staff members
moving on (only one of whom has remained in the
country in the same area of work).
While relations are good between WFP HQ (VAM and
ODAN) and the country office VAM unit, the perception of
the country office is that HQ is not sufficiently aware of
the Ethiopian operating environment and the food
security- and EFSA-related analytical issues and constraints.
While HQ is generally responsive to requests from the
country office, a more proactive approach and engagement
with the country office, particularly in addressing some of
the more fundamental and strategic aspects of food
security analysis, would be beneficial.
Addressing many of these issues depends on organising
the VAM unit to meet both internal and external demands
for information, and providing adequate funding to do so.
Meeting internal demands and activities 
• Fulfilling day-to-day internal operational information
requirements.
• Providing analytical input into programme strategies.
• Organisation and storage of information – databases,
filing systems.
34  The EC has funded the market price database of the Ethiopian Grain Trade
Enterprise for some years and has proposed the development of a new market
price system. This has been rejected by government on the basis of the
‘Woreda-net’ project, which will connect all woredas in the country and
through which the government is hoping to design a market price
information system.
35 Capacity issues other than those relating to WFP are beyond the scope of this
study. However, the capacity questions discussed here should be seen in the
light of the need to support good assessment practice more generally,
including the work of the DPPC in this area.
Meeting external demands and activities 
• Developing deeper, broader food security analysis.
• Contributing to methodological developments within
the EWWG.
• Networking and interacting with external partners.
Meeting these demands is a large task for the current VAM
unit structure. A senior analyst could be added to ensure
that both internal and external demands for VAM input are
better met, and coordination could be improved with
other relevant agencies, including FAO.
A concern about staff progression and advancement was
mentioned to the study team, at international and national
levels. The level of these posts and the possibility of their
progression could usefully be assessed.
Increased funding for VAM is consistent with the recent
external auditors’ report to the Executive Board. The
Anderson and Choularton (2004) report also recommends
increasing the capacity of FEWS NET in Ethiopia.
4.3.2 Independence and advocacy
Current EFSA practice is not perceived as credible by key
actors, with the result that information and analysis is
subject to manipulation and lacks rigour. This applies
directly to the multi-agency assessment and appeal, where
some actors within the UN have suggested that they have
been co-opted by the government.
Questions have been raised about the reliability of different
types of primary data, including crop production estimates
(Sandford, 2002).36 
Achieving substantial changes in any environment requires
access to a good network of ‘decision-makers’ and
‘technicians’ bringing to the table practical ideas and
suggestions. Informal networks with government and
other agencies are particularly important, and were
highlighted by two UN country representatives during the
course of this study.
There are many entry points for engagement, including
through the M & E system of the Safety Net Programme,
next year’s SDPRP/PRSP process, the DPPC/SC UK and
DPPC/FEWS NET initiatives and the UNICEF EOS nutrition
screening programme. Coordination around food security-
related information and analysis and the EFSA is
considered poor, with WFP not as visible as it has been in
the past. Explanations for this include a lack of regular
meetings of the EWWG and its sub-groups, as well as
WFP’s high staff turnover in recent months.37
Different food security agencies and methods have been in
competition in Ethiopia for years, ultimately to the
detriment of the profession and the people these agencies
are meant to help. Although this has been much less the
case in recent years, the current transition period in the
country appears to be making communication and
coordination particularly difficult. There are opportunities
for WFP to add significant value, by assisting the DPPC in
bringing relevant stakeholders together, in order to
acknowledge the EFSA’s weaknesses and build consensus
around a common approach, developing linkages between
different components of an overall system.
4.4 Planning issues
4.4.1 Seasonality
The timing of the current EFSA is closely associated with
the meher season, which is generally agreed to be the most
important period of the year for the largest number of
chronically food-insecure households. However, over
recent years the number of different livelihood groups
affected by food insecurity has expanded into, and within,
other regions, e.g. SNNPR, Afar and Somali region.
Although assessments have expanded to account for seasonal
variation, there is currently a lack of accessible documen-
tation on the different seasonal calendars relevant to the
different livelihood groups of Ethiopia.38 There are four
main seasonal patterns, meher and belg and gu and deyr,39 and
each of these seasons has slightly different ‘normal’ start and
end times across the country,40 and different significance for
the different livelihood groups.
Preparing timelines of seasonal calendars for many generic
(livelihood-based) population groups would be relatively
simple and potentially very useful. With this information,
the importance of particular times for particular indicators
would be identified, which is critical for monitoring the
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36 The Ministry of Agriculture and Central Statistical Authority produced
different crop production figures for the last harvest.
37 It is also recognised that 2005 may be a particularly difficult year with the
instability within the DPPC, the formation of the FSCB, and the turnover of
staff within the DPPC, SC UK and FEWS NET, as well as the elections.
38 It was pointed out to the study team that there are detailed seasonal calendars
produced by the MoARD, but it is clear that, whether from the MoARD or
other sources, limited use is being made of them.
39 Particular names will vary from location to location.
40 For example, the ITCZ weather front moves from west to east over several
weeks.
Box 5: Is there a credibility gap?
There is reason enough for different actors – particularly
donors – to question the rigour and objectiveness of the
EFSA. It is, however, worth noting that, regardless of the
credibility of information systems, prejudices about the
accuracy of information and findings are often encountered.
Donors often bypass information systems and use their own
experts to determine whether a response is required, what
scale the response should be, or whether the type of
response falls within their mandate.
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development of the season and ultimately for influencing
the appropriate time for assessments (or information-
gathering) in particular areas.
4.4.2 Region-based information systems, products and
analysis
Information dissemination and use for DPPC purposes has
involved collecting at the bottom and transmitting to the top
(Chapman, 2005). Use of data and information has been
extremely limited at the lower levels of government, woreda,
zone or region (Sandford, 2002; Chapman 2005). This is
consistent with Ethiopia’s history of centralised government.
The ongoing decentralisation process will take time, and
major capacity-building will be required to empower
regions to build their own systems and conduct their own
analysis. The UN is also exploring the possibility of
decentralising.As noted earlier, current initiatives to improve
early warning and EFSA are region-based.41 WFP already has
a significant presence at the regional level, through its sub-
offices and VAM focal points,42 and thereby good networks
with regional government actors.
Improving information collection and analysis through the
DPPC (and FSCB) at the regional level may offer some
potential. Reviewing WFP’s experience in Somali Region,
where it has worked closely with the DPPC/SC UK early-
warning system, would reveal constraints and opportunities
to developing a more regional approach. WFP is well placed
to conduct a review of the constraints to, and opportunities
for, improving EFSA on a regional basis, investigating the
institutional dynamics, reliability and use of data and infor-
mation, as well as the motivations and vested interests of
different actors.
41 DPPC/SC UK in Somali Region; DPPC/FEWS NET in SNNPR; DPPC/PCDP/SC
UK forthcoming in Afar, as well as South Omo Zone in SNNPR, Borena Zone
in Oromiya, and Somali region.
42 WFP is the most decentralised of the UN agencies, as the government has
been resisting the general decentralisation of the UN.This study finds that the
current VAM focal points have very limited capacity to do food security
analysis work on top of their original workload and over very large areas.
Box 6: The Annual Appeal documents
The major output of the assessment findings, analysis and
process is the annual Humanitarian Appeal for Ethiopia.43 The
2005 Appeal organises findings and ‘needs’ into the following
sectors:44
• Food (in metric tonnes and cash equivalent) 
• Health and Nutrition (including supplementary food) 
• Water and Sanitation 
• Agriculture 
• Disaster Response Capacity Strengthening 
• Overall Coordination 
The Appeal documents generally describe the methodology of
the assessment as follows:45
predominantly qualitative and in order to substantiate
information from zonal and woreda officials, teams used
rapid rural assessment techniques (such as interviews with
key informant and on the spot inspection of crops, live-
stock, pests, pasture and market conditions) where
situations permitted. Interviews were conducted at woreda
level with local officials, communities and house-hold.
Teams evaluated the main food security indicators: 1)
weather conditions; 2) Meher production and market
conditions; 3) other income sources, wage labour oppor-
tunities and purchasing power; 4) livestock holding and
productivity; 5) performance of cash crops such as coffee
and chat; 6) movement of people/migration. Team briefed
and debriefed at the federal, regional and zonal level.
The documents contain some discussion of the conceptual
and operational changes occurring in the country, such as the
need to move away from a ‘food first’ approach, the separation
of chronic from acute food-insecure caseloads, and the need
for ‘non-food’ interventions. There are also references to
ongoing operational concerns, such as difficulties in the
targeting of food aid.
In terms of the food security components, all of the
documents, from zonal to national, have brief summary
statements under many of the headings identified in 1) to 5)
above. The emphasis is generally on rainfall and crop
production, with resultant comments on water and pasture
availability and possibly very brief references to areas such as
market and price issues and labour opportunities. 
From a critical perspective, none of these documents, from the
lowest to the highest level, move beyond rather general
background statements that justify or support the final figures
for beneficiary numbers, tonnages and required funds. There
is no intermediate analysis process or more detailed
information or reports behind the final Appeal summary. 
In addition, there is some concern about the lack of clarity with
regard to the (expanding) ‘non-food’ sector, in terms of what
constitutes emergency or chronic problems and needs. For
example, the 2004 assessment included equipment for schools.
Without greater clarity, the ‘non-food’ component runs the risk
of being perceived as a free-for-all funding mechanism.
43 The 2005 and 2004 documents were reviewed for this study along with
an example of an actual zonal (the first or lowest level at which findings
are converted in to a report) and regional food security/harvest report,
which feed directly in to the final Appeal. The Humanitarian Appeal
reports are easily found on the internet. The 2005 Appeal is found at
http://www.ocha-eth.org/Reports/downloadable/jointGivUNAppeal
2005.pdf 
44 The 2004 Appeal also included HIV/AIDS, Child Protection and
Education. The review of the 2004 Appeal in the following year’s
appeal found that these sectors were insignificantly funded. 
45 The 2004 Appeal has an appendix on ‘methodologies for deter-
mining needs’.
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Over the course of the past three years, WFP ODAN and
VAM have hosted a series of EFSA consultative workshops
with experts from many agencies, fields of expertise and
geographic regions (WFP, 2003). Four key themes
emerged as special challenges for good practice:
distinguishing between chronic and transitory food
insecurity; assessing the role of markets; assessing non-
food response options; and assessing the effects and impact
of food aid. In addition to reviewing the overall rigour of
EFSA practice, the current study gives specific attention to
the ability of current practice to address these key themes.
For each, a brief review of key issues is followed by a
description of current practice in Ethiopia, and options for
strengthening assessment practice.
5.1 Assessing chronic versus transitory needs
The determination of chronic versus transitory food
insecurity has critical implications for the type and duration
of intervention measures.Whereas transitory food insecurity
brought on by a sudden shock may be adequately addressed
through the immediate provision of resource transfers or
other short-term responses, chronic food insecurity requires
a long-term commitment, not only to ensure that people’s
immediate survival needs are met, but also to address the
more structural and long-term factors that lead to chronic
food insecurity (Macrae and Harmer, 2004).
An extension of the discussion on chronic food insecurity is
that of destitution. Devereux (2003) argues that destitution
is distinct from the concept of chronic poverty: whereas
‘chronic poverty’ emphasises duration, ‘destitution’ stresses
severity. Similarly, the severity of food insecurity should be
distinguished from the question of duration or recurrence.
In practice, periods of acute food insecurity – the inability
to access adequate food in the short term – may be a
recurrent feature of life for many. The distinction between
acute/transitory and chronic food insecurity is to that extent
an artificial one. Many families hover permanently close to
the minimum subsistence threshold, and are chronically
vulnerable to shocks which take them below that line.
As described above, the Productive Safety Net Programme
(2004) is an attempt to address longer-term needs for
chronically food-insecure people. While reviewing the
potential efficacy of the PSNP in achieving this goal is
beyond the remit of this study, what is relevant is the
ability of assessment practice to distinguish chronically
from transitorily affected groups.
Current practice in Ethiopia utilises two general approaches
to this challenge of distinguishing chronic from transitory
food insecurity.These can be characterised as: (1) a functional
approach, which emphasises the previous history and duration
of food aid receipts for identifying beneficiaries; and (2) an
indicator approach, whereby chronically food-insecure woredas
are defined and ranked by statistical analysis of a number of
variables related to food insecurity.
The PSNP Implementation Manual (GoE, 2004) provides
clear guidance for identifying chronically food-insecure
woredas and households. This is in line with the functional
approach. The Manual defines chronically food-insecure
woredas and households as:
(a) Chronically food-insecure woredas:
• For the purposes of the Safety Net, a woreda is considered
chronically food insecure if it (a) is in one of eight
regions (Tigray, Amhara, Oromiya, SNNP, Afar, Somali,
rural Harari and Dire Dawa), and (b) has been a
recipient of food aid for a significant period, generally
for at least each of the last three years.
• According to the DPPC list of woredas, 262 woredas currently
satisfy the two conditions stated above.
(b) Chronically food-insecure households:
• For the purposes of the Safety Net, a household is
considered chronically food-insecure if it is located in one
of the 262 chronically food-insecure woredas (as defined
above); and
• has been assessed by a mix of administrative guidelines
and community knowledge to have faced continuous
food shortages (usually three months of food gap or
more) in the last three years and received food assistance.
• This also includes households that suddenly become
more vulnerable as a result of a severe loss of assets and
are unable to support themselves (last 1-2 years).
• Any household without family support and other
means of social protection and support.
• In the first year of the Safety Net programme, the
community food security task force establishes a
baseline list of chronically food-insecure households.
This list will be updated each year (GoE, 2004).
While the emphasis of this approach is on the previous
history of receiving food aid, the guidelines do allow for
the inclusion of households that have experienced a
sudden shock, or that are without social support.
Certainly, a programme of this size (the PSNP expects to
benefit roughly five million people annually) will require
clear and consistent guidelines, and those outlined above are
an attempt at clarity and consistency.That said, there remain
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at least three concerns. First, inasmuch as the identification
of PSNP beneficiaries is based on past receipts of food aid,
and given that the system used to identify previous food aid
recipients is of questionable validity, the use of this
mechanism could perpetuate previous mis-targeting.
Second, given that the beneficiary list will be updated each
year, in the absence of any indication of more robust
assessment methods under development the PSNP
beneficiary selection risks being driven by negotiation,
which is open to bias and influence from non-technical
factors. Third, while the functional definition of previous
food aid receipts is meant to be objective and easily
operational, it risks taking attention away from the structural
issues that lead to chronic vulnerability.
On this last concern, it is important to note that the PSNP
guidelines make explicit reference to linkages between the
PSNP and other food security programmes, noting that
PSNP inputs (cash and food) are not enough to address
chronic vulnerability, and are best accompanied by inter-
ventions that address structural issues.
The indicator approach is well illustrated by the Chronic
Vulnerability Index (CVI), an analytical effort led by WFP
VAM. The CVI is a statistical tool that brings together a
number of socio-economic indicators related to food
security into a single index value.This allows for the relative
ranking of woredas.46 The CVI has been in development for
several years, and interim results are available. However, there
is as yet no broad consensus as to their validity.
In principle, the CVI is a means to identify and rank
woredas based on an analysis of more structural factors.
This can only be achieved, however, if the indicators
selected are based on a sound conceptual framework, and
if the interactions between the variables (including issues
of weighting and auto-correlation) are well understood.
The VAM unit is trying to improve the CVI through
consultative meetings.The CVI approach has the potential
to place greater emphasis on understanding the structural
dynamics of chronic food insecurity, which would assist
in developing more strategic interventions beyond
food/cash assistance and work programmes. It may also
enable more attention to the structural causes of food
insecurity.
In addition to addressing specific methodological issues
noted above, it may also be possible to make more explicit
linkages between the CVI and the PSNP woreda selection
process. The spatial correlation between these two results
should be analysed for consistency and difference: where
differences exist, there is an opportunity for further analysis
as to the reasons why and, programmatically, justification for
inclusion in the PSNP. From the EFSA perspective, the CVI is
currently used as a reference for cross-checking assessment
findings within WFP, but it is not systematically part of the
EFSA. To enable more systematic use of the CVI, typologies
of woredas could be developed with similar structural
characteristics, and this information could be provided in
summary form to assessment teams.
5.2 Assessing the role of markets 
The forthcoming WFP EFSA Guidelines place significant
emphasis on understanding the role of markets as an
integral part of an EFSA. While EFSA interest in market
analysis lies ultimately in understanding household food
security, market analysis typically requires a macro
analytical perspective, with scales of analysis ranging from
community, to national to international levels.
Key questions from the new WFP EFSA Guidelines
concerning market analysis include:
• Do markets in normal times work well enough to
ensure food availability at national and local levels?
• What is the maximum extent to which increases in
food supply – as a result of different interventions (e.g.
in-kind, cash, local purchases) – can take place without
introducing substantial market distortions (e.g.
discouraging flows from surplus areas to deficit areas)?
• What are the estimated price impacts of planned
humanitarian interventions? (It is helpful here to have
an overview of price changes in earlier large-scale
market transactions and humanitarian interventions.)
• How would existing market linkages be affected as a
consequence of humanitarian interventions?
• Is it possible to design a portfolio of interventions
(instead of a single large intervention) to minimise the
impact of a single large commodity-based intervention
(e.g. food aid complemented with cash transfers and
policy measures)?
• To what extent can the market meet the demand for
food now and in the coming months?
• What are the constraints, if any, to market functioning?
• What contingencies could enhance or further inhibit
the capacity of markets to meet demand? 
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46 A similar statistical aggregation technique is Principal Components Analysis,
which has been used by WFP VAM in several countries not only to do rankings,
but also to identify clusters of administrative units with similar vulnerability
characteristics, which supports strategic programme development to address
key aspects of vulnerability.
Box 7: Crisis as opportunity
There is significant scope as part of the EFSA process to
embrace the concept of ‘crisis as opportunity’ – meaning a
crisis creates critical awareness of, and attention to, conditions
of food insecurity, and thus is an opportunity to channel
attention towards support (political, financial, technical) for
often-neglected and more intractable long-term problems. To
seize these opportunities requires explicit linkages between
short- and long-term problem analysis and response.
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Assessing the role of markets is critical to EFSA practice in
terms of understanding: (1) a key indicator of food
insecurity (i.e. market price fluctuations and their
livelihood impacts); (2) market interventions that may
directly mitigate food insecurity without the use of food
aid per se; and (3) the potential negative impacts of
humanitarian interventions on market systems, which may
have long-term negative consequences on production and
trade.
When considering the degree to which the role of markets
is incorporated into assessment practice, it is important to
recognise that such analysis can occur as part of the
interagency field assessment, as well as through other,
complementary studies that focus more on macro-level
analysis. As for the DPPC-led inter-agency assessment, the
field checklist includes questions about market issues as
they relate to household food access. As noted previously,
however, there is no rigorous system for consistently
collecting and analysing this information, and the
implications for food insecurity.
Inasmuch as market analysis is meant to answer the macro-
oriented questions above, such information is best gained
from separate, but potentially complementary, studies.
Recent studies include: (1) the report on cereal availability
in 2004/05 (WFP, EC and SIDA); (2) the FAO/WFP Crop
and Food Supply Assessment Missions; (3) the MOARD
report on agricultural input and product marketing
strategy and implementation mechanisms; and (4) the
USAID-supported Bellmon study.
Market monitoring is undertaken by several institutions in
Ethiopia, including the Central Statistical Authority, the
Ethiopian Grain Trading Enterprise (EGTE), the Bureau of
Agriculture and the Bureau of Medium and Small
Enterprise and Industry Development (BoMSEID). NGOs
and UN organisations monitor prices in their project areas.
None of these market information systems is integrated;
they are made up of different types of information and
commodities, and are rarely complete. Only limited
analytical use is made of them (ODI-SC UK Cash Review
Draft, 2005).
The EC has a strong interest in improving the understanding
of cereal markets, particularly in light of its preference for
cash over food aid. A 2003 report to the Commission has a
brief description and overview of the Ethiopian grain
marketing system, with reference to many documents and
Ethiopian experts.The EC has also been supporting a market
information system through the Ethiopian Grain Trade
Enterprise for some years, and is keen to fund a food grain
market information system, although this is potentially not
consistent with the government’s commitment to the
Woreda-Net communications system, which is supposed to
include market information.
While the studies noted above are informative with regard
to the possibilities of local procurement, monetisation, the
potential effects on markets of humanitarian responses and
market trends, there are at least two ways in which their
contributions could be strengthened for overall food
security analysis.
One option is for the analysis to explicitly explore the
possibilities of market interventions – in their own right –
to mitigate food insecurity for a particular emergency (e.g.
subsidies, policy shifts related to increasing access to food,
communication of market data to traders and the public).
In particular, there seems to be a significant opportunity to
expand the current scope of the CFSAM to more explicitly
consider market interventions (the pros and cons) in
mitigating food insecurity.
The second and more obvious option for strengthening
market analysis is to draw explicitly on the reports noted
above in the overall analysis of humanitarian needs. The
current DPPC-led inter-agency assessment report does not
make such explicit linkages, and as such seems to exclude
information that would be useful for comprehensive market
analysis.
5.3 Assessing non-food response options
The problematic term ‘non-food response’ has at least three
possible meanings: (1) key sectoral needs in response to an
emergency (i.e. as outlined in the IASC CAP Needs Analysis
Framework, including shelter, water, food security,
education, infrastructure, HIV/AIDS, health); (2) in the
phrase ‘non-food items’, to signify the provision of such
goods as utensils and clothes; and (3) responses other than
the provision of food aid per se, that directly aim to increase
food access or availability.
From the broad ENA perspective, the term ‘non-food
response’ implies humanitarian needs in sectors other than
food aid per se. While such needs usually exist, used in this
way it is still problematic in that it can disproportionately
privilege food aid over other sectoral responses (over 50%
of the current Ethiopia humanitarian appeal is for food aid).
More problematic from a food security (i.e. EFSA) per-
spective, the term ‘non-food response’ is readily interpreted
by most practitioners to mean other sectoral interventions,
and so diverts attention from the range of response options
aimed at directly increasing food access, availability and utilisation in the
short term, which do not involve food aid per se (e.g., market
interventions, policy shifts, cash assistance, international
advocacy of human rights, complementarity with health
interventions).
There has been much recent debate on cash assistance
(grant or in exchange for work) as a complement or
alternative to food aid. One of the key recommendations of
a recent ODI study (Harvey, 2005) is that assessments
typically do not conduct adequate problem analysis that
would highlight a potential role for non-food responses
such as cash (e.g distinguishing food availability from food
access problems), and link that analysis to a variety of
response options, including increasing food access
through directly increasing purchasing power.
It would be short-sighted, however, to focus the discussion
of non-food responses on cash alone.The range of possible
non-food responses is potentially quite large, but tends to be
ignored in favour of the food gap-and-fill perspective.
Current EFSA practice in Ethiopia emphasises the idea that
‘non-food response’ means ‘other sectoral responses’, as
opposed to a holistic response to food insecurity specifically.
The DPPC-led inter-agency assessment guidelines emphasise
that food security interventions are meant to fill a food gap
(typically with food aid), as opposed to addressing the
multiple causes of food insecurity.
At the field level, analytical frameworks can be developed
that encourage a broad understanding of food insecurity,
and that link this causal analysis to response options that
include, but are not limited to, food aid. In this way, analysis
would be engaged in both the problem and the solution; the
analysis would take into consideration a deeper
understanding of food insecurity, and would explore
options for mitigating the problem.At the macro level, there
is wide scope for expanding the current focus of CFSAMs to
include similar problem/solution analysis that would
include policy, market, advocacy and other options 
5.4 Assessing the effects and impact of food aid 
Understanding the effects and impact of food aid requires
that other key components of the Humanitarian
Information System described in Chapter 1 are in place. In
particular, an analyst must have some baseline reference of
key indicators (either for a ‘normal year’ or for a period of
time just prior to the intervention), a monitoring system
that tracks changes in those indicators, and the analytical
capacity to determine to what degree any correlation of
monitoring indicators with interventions is due to the
intervention itself, or some other cause.
WFP currently conducts a Food Aid Utilisation and Impact
Study (FAUIS) following emergency responses. It is not
clear, however, how this study is linked to actual
assessment information, or how it can distinguish
correlation from causation. Indeed, with the conventional
expectation that food aid will ‘roll over’ to the next season,
little attention is paid to the actual impact of a given
intervention.
The FAUIS methods for assessing the impact of food aid do
not appear to refer to available livelihood baseline or
reference information and descriptions. Therefore it is not
easy to interpret findings, and findings may be generalised
over different population/livelihood groups.47
WFP’s MERET development programme (Managing
Environmental Resources to Enable Transition to More
Sustainable Livelihoods) has relatively recently been
assessed, and it appears to have had very encouraging
results, particularly in terms of community perceptions of
improvements in their income and food security status.
The MERET reports also have useful background
information on the local livelihood characteristics of the
target populations. It is not clear whether or how the
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Box 8: FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment
Missions – rubber stamp or opportunity for holistic
analysis?
The CFSAM is a routine and integral component of annual
needs assessments in Ethiopia. Indeed, it is commonly
viewed as a ‘stamp of approval’ for GoE agricultural
production estimates, and its findings are a reference point
for the final ‘Appeal’ figures. While an important exercise, the
CFSAM is criticised by key actors on two distinct counts: (1) it
is viewed as too uncritical of agricultural production
estimates and does not make explicit efforts to reconcile
other information sources, such as the Bellmon study (even
within the GoE there was disagreement on production
estimates for the previous meher season); and (2), while
recognised as a pillar of information for food security
analysis, the CFSAM’s emphasis on food availability tends to
dictate the overall problem/solution analysis.
With its macro and potentially broad perspective on food
security, the CFSAM is uniquely placed to engage in more
holistic analysis of the causes of food security – not only
identifying gaps in food availability, but also critically
examining the range of causes of food insecurity, and thus
the range of potential short- and long-term interventions.
While such a mandate differs from the historic focus of
CFSAMs, there is a great need for a forum for such holistic
analysis, which could either be woven into the existing
CFSAM structure or explicitly added as another step in the
annual assessment process.
FAO and WFP are currently undergoing a global review of the
CFSAM’s scope and methods, with the aim of improving
methods and relevance to overall food security analysis.
47 The FAUIS used the Coping Strategies Index (CSI) tool developed by WFP
and CARE. The CSI manual stresses that a certain amount of ‘up front’ work
is required, particularly to identify ‘the right list of coping behaviours’.
While this study is by no means a critique of the FAUIS, the discussion in
the ‘lessons learned’ paper on the FAUIS (WFP, 2003) suggests that this was
indeed a problem. For example, knowing what the traditional hungry period
is for different livelihood groups (pastoral, agro-pastoral, pure farming, etc)
would help to determine whether it was appropriate for Afaris to receive
regular food aid distributions between January and August (as happened),
and, for example, how this affected normal or distress coping strategies.
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content of MERET reports is absorbed by the VAM unit in
order to increase its understanding of local food security
issues in project areas, and perhaps to cross-check with
other sources of information that describe food security
conditions and issues in the same areas/woredas.
The impact of food aid is also linked to entry/exit criteria.
Having clear criteria that are linked to international
standards around when to intervene would also provide a
measure of when to exit. Such standards also ensure
consistency as to when and how to intervene in an
emergency situation. One example of such standards is the
Somalia FSAU Food and Livelihood Security Phase
Classification, which utilises consistent criteria – linked to
internationally accepted standards – for classifying
populations as being in a Humanitarian Emergency, in a
Livelihood Crisis, or at Alert and non-Alert status (FSAU
Technical Series September 2004).48 Focusing on specific
indicators for entry/exit criteria not only provides a
measure of project impact, but can also direct strategic
planning on how best to achieve the intended outcome.
Whereas a general goal of reducing food insecurity is
rather abstract, an aim of (say) reducing malnutrition from
18% GAM to 10% GAM for a given population is a clear
and measurable objective that can guide strategic thinking.
Understanding the impacts of food aid would be
strengthened through the clear identification of measurable
indicators at the outset of a crisis that are relevant to a given
livelihood system, and to monitor those indicators through-
out programme implementation. While the ‘outcome’
indicator of nutrition is one obvious data source, others exist.
One option, used as part of the FAUIS, is the Coping
Strategies Index (CSI), developed by WFP and CARE.The CSI
tracks the degree to which a given population is engaged in
coping strategies that are directly linked to the severity of
food insecurity.The utility of CSI is in its longitudinal analysis
(meaning before, during and after the intervention).
Additional indicators of food aid impact include market
prices, the migration flows of people and livestock, health
status and school attendance rates. To monitor such changes
would require establishing a data collection and analysis
system that is directly linked to anticipated changes in key
indicators in the wake of an intervention.
48 This approach is currently being developed for the DPPC/PCDP/SC UK
Pastoral Early Warning System in Ethiopia.
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While famines in Ethiopia have largely been avoided in
recent years, there remains a pressing need to improve the
quality and credibility of current EFSA practice. It is
imperative to build a consensual understanding of the
nature and magnitude of food security crises, lest the
government, donors and agencies fail to accept and act on
assessment findings, misdirect limited resources or pursue
potentially damaging interventions. The current annual
needs assessment is a mixture of non-systematic methods,
and is ultimately based on negotiations between assessment
teams, government agencies and international agencies.
Negotiation is not intrinsically a negative process. Indeed,
current practice benefits greatly from local knowledge and
potential transparency. Rather, EFSA practice needs
complementary and more explicit evidence-based analysis
that is systematic and consistent, with analytical frameworks
that enable more in-depth understanding of food access,
availability and utilisation. Strong conceptual frameworks
concerning food security analysis exist within the key
government policy documents; the challenge is to
adequately operationalise these in the EFSA.
In addition to improving general credibility, opportunities
exist to expand the current EFSA emphasis on food aid
needs towards a more holistic problem analysis that
identifies structural issues associated with chronic food
insecurity, examines the role and impact of markets,
explores non-food responses to food insecurity and
investigates the impact of a food aid intervention.
Addressing the opportunities for strengthening practice
identified in this report is not an easy task: many of these
issues are not new to the various actors, and notable
attempts to improve practice have been made in the past.
This report highlights a number of factors that make EFSA
practice particularly challenging in Ethiopia. While the
GoE rightly remains central to the EFSA process, WFP in
particular is being called upon by international actors to
play a greater role.
Addressing the multitude of issues required to improve
EFSA is likely to require creating the space (time, financial
and political) to step back and address fundamentals of
food security information systems. There is a wealth of
knowledge and experience of direct relevance, much of it
found within the Ethiopian experience. However, day-to-
day operational demands limit the time and energy
available to think about the bigger picture, and to develop
practical steps to achieve an overall systems approach and
analytical framework that can connect existing efforts and
components of a system, and clarify the roles of different
actors. The current transitional period in Ethiopia, while
creating many uncertainties about the future, offers
immense opportunities as new relationships, mandates
and expectations are emerging.
Perhaps the ultimate limitation (or, rather, potential driving
force) towards improving EFSA is not to be found in im-
proved methods per se, but in the extent to which govern-
ments, implementing agencies and donors demand better,
more credible and more relevant information. Assessment
missions should be asked to substantiate findings, and the
process would benefit from incentive/disincentive mech-
anisms that reward and acknowledge sound practice. With-
out consistent demand, even the most credible evidence-
based methodologies will be easily sidelined.
Chapter 6
Conclusions
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1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
Global food security:
dominance of global and
national food supply
concerns. 
Introduction of ‘Nutrition
Surveillance’ by UN after
1974 World Food
Conference – led to two-
tier operational system: 
1) supply-based system
(FAO) for estimating need;
and 2) indicator systems
for local access.
1975–85: food supply to
food access shift.
Entitlement theory (Sen,
1981); individual and
household access. 
‘Golden era’ of food
security in development
thinking.
1975–85: food supply to
food access 
Objective indicators to
subjective perceptions.
Poverty, not food security
(1991–95) 
1996 – World Food Summit
(increased food
production or
consumption and access).
‘Food first’ to broader
‘livelihoods’ perspective.
Objective indicators to
subjective perceptions.
Livelihoods and
vulnerability emphasis.
‘Availability at all times of
adequate world supplies of
basic food-stuffs … to
sustain a steady expansion
of food consumption … and
to offset fluctuations in
production and prices’ (UN
1975).
‘Access by all people at all
times to enough food for
an active, healthy life’
(World Bank, 1986). 
The viability of the
household as a productive
and reproductive unit (not)
threatened by food
shortage (Frankenberger
and Goldstein, 1991).
CFSAM – Food supply-
dominated. 
Discussion of other
methods e.g. ‘functional
classification’ – a
livelihood based
classification (Payne,
1976)
Indicator-based systems:
rainfall, prices, nutrition.
CFSAM – food supply
dominated.
Introduction of access-
based information
systems: livelihood
baselines + indicators for
prediction, the
assessment of need and
impact evaluation.
Increased access-based
assessments. 
CFSAM – food supply;
increased recognition of
access issues.
Increased emphasis on
livelihood-based
information systems – for
early warning,
vulnerability and poverty
monitoring and analysis. 
CFSAM under review 
1971–75: sequence of rain
failures. Excess mortality
approx. 30,000. Significant
livestock losses. 
1983–85: sequence of rain
failures. Eight million
affected. Estimated
mortality of up to 1 million
people. Tigray and Wollo
most affected.
1990–93: rain failure and
regional conflicts.
Estimated 4 million people
suffering food shortages.
1993–94: 4 million people
requiring food assistance,
including demobilised
army and Somali refugees. 
1994: 5.6 million requiring
food assistance. Most
affected area Borena
pastoral lowlands and
SNNPR especially Wolayta.
1999/2000: 10 million
people requiring food
assistance primarily belg-
dependent and
pastoralists mostly in
Somali Region; some
meher-dependent.
2002/2003: 12.5 million
people requiring food
assistance, primarily
meher-dependent farmers
agro-pastoralists in the
east, pastoralists in the
north-east (Afar) and belg-
dependent in the south.
Annex 1
Changes in food security-related theory and practice (with reference to Ethiopia)
Conceptual
shifts
Definitions of
food security
General
development
of information
and
assessment
systems
Ethiopia-
specific
events
(continued)
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EW Dept. established
within Relief and
Rehabilitation Commission
following 1974 famine.
Donors provided strong
support at the
establishment phase but
funding was cut
considerably as donors
disagreed with the policies
of the Derg regime. 
Introduction of ‘food
supply matrix’ (Hay, 1974)
in RRC, which contained
elements of livelihood
analysis. 
National system based on
crop assessments by
Ministry of Agriculture.
No EWS, constraints on
collecting information due
to war. However there was
a Nutritional Surveillance
Programme, no objective
information dissemination.
Nutrition Surveillance
Programme in Wollo,
Wolaita, Hararghe, Ogaden
– important contribution
to EW but political
interference.
Limited early donor
response to famine. 
Mature early-warning
systems (DPPC, VAM/WFP,
FEWS/USAID, NGOs),
greater
cooperation/information-
sharing with GoE,
warnings initiated in June
1999; EWS in pastoral
areas insufficient.
Continuation of Nutritional
Surveillance Programme
(DPPC/SC UK) (early
1990s–2001). 
Development of National
Policy on Disaster
Prevention and
Management (1993). DPPC
replaces RRC and initiates
annual needs assessment
and appeals. 
Establishment of
Emergency Food Security
Reserve Administration.
Focus on DPPC capacity-
building, DPPC
Information Centre
created, WFP/UNEUE/
FEWS NET technical and
financial support, EWS in
Somali Region fully
functioning, inadequate
early-warning system in
SNNPR and Afar Region.
Sufficient, however
assistance arrived after
the majority of deaths had
occurred (Jun–Dec 1994).
Sufficient, however
assistance arrived after
the majority of deaths had
occurred (April 1000).
Sufficient, though with
record requirements (1.5m
MT) rations reduced
Jan–Jun). 
Increased local purchase
of food aid from 2001.
Annex 1 (continued)
Ethiopia
early-warning
systems
Ethiopia food
aid response
1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s
Adapted from Devereux and Maxwell, 2001, with inputs from WFP SMG background paper, John Seaman
35
Emergency needs assessment, Ethiopia
Year Methodological issue/event
1998/1999 • Road bias
• Focus on woredas (no hh or community interviews) 
• No recognition or reference to hh coping mechanisms 
• Wide geographic coverage 
• Inadequate time for quality interviews 
• Time of assessment not conducive to seeing production 
• Baseline information fragmented and inconsistent 
• Extensive checklists which have no relation to baseline information
• Chronic/acute division required by donors, but problematic
1999/2000 • Weighting system for income and food price ratings
• No recognition of actual problem or change
• Production shortfalls captured through proxy indicators
• No interviews with hhs or communities
• No reference to expandability of options or coping mechanisms
• Problems with chronic vulnerability index ratings developed by WFP and field-tested in previous assessment 
• Division between chronic and acute not solved by methodological adjustments
2000/2001 Three main problems identified by EWWG:
• Changes to formats required 
Solution: To change the woreda relief assistance forms (requirement for identification of problems per location
and numbers in need per agro-ecological zone) 
• Chronic vulnerability index – general agreement that use of ratings upwardly biased figures in areas where it 
was high (4–5) and underestimated where ratings were low (1–2) 
Solution: To revisit indicators and look at ways to include stakeholder participation in rating per woreda. 
However, no consensus on whether indicators would be used as ‘baseline’ information or used in calculation
• Current vulnerability – agreement on need to revisit methodology and address issues related to food, income,
expenditure and expandability in reference to current year problem 
Solution: EWWG methodology sub-group tasked with proposing changes. Three different formats developed and
presented in an effort to reach consensus. Initial presentation by SC UK, with adjustments made by WFP/CIDA/ 
SCUK. Second format presented by DPPC with few changes to address issues identified. Third format was an 
attempt to combine the two proposals. DPPC refused to use the ‘combined’ methodology in needs assessment, 
but agreed to pilot in following assessment with guidance from the Methodology sub-group
2001/2002 Consultant with experience of tackling similar issues in other countries identified by WFP (Frank Reily). 
Objectives of consultancy included: 
(1) Improvements to methodology proposed (through review of three versions proposed by sub-group) 
(2)Greater coordination and consistency in application of the methodology 
(3)Decentralisation of needs assessment process with capacity to implement 
• Consultant visited three times 
September 2001: fact-finding and consensus mission (field trip to East Hararghe) 
October 2001: stakeholder consultations, etc.
December 2001: piloting in North Shewa 
• Key issues investigated: 
(1) normal vs. last year as reference year 
(2) income vs. expenditure as basis for estimate of what people have
(3)PRA/RRA vs. individual hh surveys
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Year Methodological issue/event
(4)proportional piling vs. direct measurement of income or expenditure
(5) level of detail required in interviews
(6)how and how far to project into future
(7)what should be included in ‘needs’ category 
(8) feasibility of proposed methodology (logistics, etc.) 
(9) measurement errors – biases from key informants 
Solution: Consultancy seemed to raise more questions than answers. Consultant produced a draft Pilot Food Aid 
Needs Assessment (FANA) Methodology: A Step-by-Step Guide, which served as starting point for further 
methodological refinements in the following year 
Mar–Dec 2002 Based on consultant’s work a number of issues needed further refinement. 
• Key issues:
(1) tools required for field work 
(2) reference year vs. coming year 
(3) food gap calculation to improve non-food requirements
(4)steps to be followed in food gap calculations
(5)determining numbers/duration once food gap established – how?
(6)How to divide chronic and acute 
(7)Reference to last year and extent of information required
(8)Design of questionnaire 
• Pre-test of checklists, tools etc in Oct 2002 in Nazareth 
• Review of pre-test, further refinement agreed 
Solution: Summary of consensus around all these issues produced by group following retreat and guidelines 
submitted to EWWG with adjustments 
2001/2002 • Methodology from 99/00 still applied by DPPC-led multi-agency needs assessment teams, with minor adjustments
August 2003 • FEG contracted to pilot needs assessment for pastoral/agro-pastoral communities in Harshin and Shinile 
Districts of Somali Region as part of SC UK’s EW project
• Utilisation of FEG spreadsheet to estimate requirements 
• Non-food requirements also included 
• Key EWWG members included in exercise 
Nov–Dec 2003 • FEG lead Deyr assessment across Somali region and estimate food and non-food requirements
Issues
• Methodology considered sound 
• Region and some areas not happy with fact that methodology reduced requirements
Jan–Feb 2004 • USAID fund further piloting in Amhara region 
• FEWS contracted as part of wider EWWG effort
• Two food economy zones across three woredas selected
• Assessment completed in Gubalafto and Sekota/Bugna 
• Findings presented to EWWG 
• Debate about key issues/constraints to methodology continued
June 2004 Key issues following piloting exercise 
Strengths
• Identifies those in deficit, for how long, and when – through a step-by-step objective/quantitative analysis
• Gives details on how people are living – sources of food, income and expenditure patterns, coping 
mechanisms, etc.
• Triangulation of information collected from different sources – uses a combination of primary and secondary 
data as well as qualitative and quantitative information
• Uses PRA tools to get more reliable information
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Year Methodological issue/event
June 2004 • Requires us to analyse as we go along – ‘on the spot’ analysis to sort out discrepancies, allowing us to 
(continued) readjust while we are still in the field 
• Findings lead to better targeting – identify the neediest populations
• Quantifies coping options/expandability
• Captures detailed changes from baseline
• Analysis is logically structured and findings are transparent and plausible
Weaknesses
• Resource-intensive (money, time, dedicated and well trained staff, logistics)
• Too much averaging of interviews concealing detailed facts can potentially lead to wrong conclusion
• Respondents are fatigued by time-consuming interviews
• Purposive sample village selection can bias final picture
• Classification of livelihood zones very complex – agro-economic zones, altitude, livelihood, dher ‘dependent’
and ‘belg dependent’, pastoral and agro-pastoral
• Secondary data problem – missing, issue of reliability, timeliness, etc.
• Variation within livelihood zone and wealth groups in reference year
• Making predictions over the coming year – have to make educated ‘guesstimates’ regarding price changes, etc. 
• Difficulty of conducting baseline and current assessment at the same time
• Separating chronic from current problems a challenge
• Non-food part not well-studied – more subjective information and not operationally useful
Suggestions for improvement 
• ENA should be done only in affected areas – EWS should give correct signal on potential problematic areas
• While ENAs will mainly focus on ‘Access’ and ‘Utilisation’ parts of food security, MoA/CSA/FAO can do 
‘Supply’ or ‘Availability’ side 
• Capacity of DPPC staff should be built for ultimate handover of whole process
• Initial ENAs should be conducted by local/zonal staff while federal/regional staff will do validation 
assessments on a sample basis
• Chronic food-insecure areas that are not affected should be studied using other methods rather than covering 
them using HEA during ENA
• Baseline data should be conducted using proper household survey – survey results should lead to 
classification of areas into homogeneous livelihood zones
• Some inconsistencies in baseline noted – when baseline data was collected trained interviewers were not 
experienced enough – baseline needs to be updated soon
• Intensive training on HEA and ENA and RRA for woreda/zone/regional/federal staff that is relevant for 
assessments
• Assessment duration should be short to ensure better participation by agencies
• Assessment instruments should focus on the most important information for the current season, shortening 
interviewing time
• More investment on baseline survey and ENA by donors should be encouraged
• Interview forms should be systematically designed on computers to enable faster data entry; analysis of 
formats should be more automated to make the process more interesting, easier and standardised
• Less motivation/interest by local/zonal/regional government participants could make sustaining the process 
difficult
• Standard reporting formats (operationally useful reports) should be designed and should be kept precise/ 
short
Draft ENA guidelines produced and presented to EWWG (June 2004); final draft pending
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Annex 3
Key changes and actors (based on SC UK, 2005)
Key events Main issues Main output Key actors Pivotal change
Workshop organised
to agree on
assessment issues
Various assessments
with different
findings 
Need for objective
means of assessing
needs, rather than
subjective 
EWWG formed WFP/DPPC Agreed to consensus-
based rather than
contradictory findings
Indicator-based
methodology
(quantitative)
proposed based on
EWS
Combination of
chronic and current
vulnerability ratings
to assess needs
Qualitative ratings for
food and income
later quantified
Lack of agreement
about methodology 
WFP, SC UK, CARE,
CIDA, DPPC,
FEWS, FAO, UNICEF 
Methodology sub-
group provided with
challenges to change
Revisit methodology
based on feedback
from EWWG and
partners
Issues around
chronic vulnerability
rating (PPND) 
Issues around
method for assessing
current vulnerability
(proxies used for all) 
Disagreement about
methodology 
(3 proposals put
forward)
Government refusal
to use revised
methodology in
needs assessment 
Commitment to pilot
in upcoming belg
assessment 
DPPC, FEWS, WFP, SC
UK, CIDA
Changes within WFP
and FEWS staff 
FEWS and Chemonics
interested in Ethiopia
and HEA 
Consultant with
needs assessment
experience in other
countries identified
by WFP and
contracted on behalf
of EWWG and
Methodology sub-
group
Issues around
methods of collection
and RRA/PRA tools,
etc.
Lack of clarity around
a range of technical
issues 
FANA methodology
step-by-step guide
SC UK, FEWS, WFP,
DPPC
Despite changes in
group composition,
core small group
continued 
Key group members
changed organis-
ations but remained
within group (shifts
within DPPC, CIDA,
WFP and FEWS)
Revision of key
issues and areas of
disagreement
(regular meetings,
field testing and a
retreat) 
Ongoing debate
about field data
collection issues, etc.
Consensus around
key issues and pilot
testing of tools etc;
proposed guidelines
Draft guidelines to
EWWG
SC UK, FEWS, WFP,
DPPC
Core group able to
move ahead with
small number
Year 
1996
1999
2000 
2001
Mar–Dec
2002 
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Formation of pastoral
sub-group by EWWG
to monitor changes in
pastoral and agro-
pastoral areas 
Huge amount of
funding etc. being
put into EW
improvements in
pastoral areas (FAO
and other actors not
involved in other EW
and ENA efforts)
Improved
coordination of
efforts aimed at
improving EW in
pastoral areas of
country 
DPPC, SC UK, FEWS DPPC recognised that
SNRS programme can
assist wider efforts 
Formation of task
groups (sectoral 
sub-groups) as part
of EWWG
Primarily due to
another emerging
crisis in 2002/03 and
need for improved
sectoral coordination
More focus on non-
food requirements 
Supposed to be
working on
methodologies for
sectors 
Government line
ministries & wider
range of NGOs 
Emergency required
this level of
coordination and
areas most affected
(pastoral and agro
pastoral) required
multi-sectoral
response
Pilot test in Harshin/
Shinile districts of
SNRS 
Planned needs
assessment exercise
as part of project 
Created forum to
revisit methodology
in different context 
FEG contracted 
Key EW people
included
Consultant
experienced and
convincing 
FEG – deyr
assessment
conducted in all of 
SNRS
Same as above Practical application
of HEA framework for
assessing emergency
requirements 
FEG contracted 
Key EW people
included 
Use of experienced
consultant and
institutional links to
functioning EWS in
SNRS (DPPC-SC UK)
FEWS consultants
(USAID-funded as
part of SC UK project) 
Pilot in ANRS,
Gubalafto,
Sekota/Bugna
Opportunity to
include more EWWG
actors in piloting
methodology further 
General agreement
on methodological
issues and draft ENA
guidelines
June 2004 
SC UK, DPPC, FEWS,
WFP, USAID, UNICEF 
USAID-funded and
included new SERA
(Strengthening
Emergency Response
Abilities) 
Preliminary livelihood
zoning conducted in
SNNPR through
FEWS 
Clusters vs. food
economy or
livelihood zones (3
woredas per zone) 
Part of new project
focused on one
region (SNNPRS)
FEWS, 
DPPC/B, USAID
initiative 
FEWS awarded by
USAID contract to do
HEA zoning,
baselines and link to
needs assessment
methodologies 
FEG highly involved
SERA changes to
EPSP (Emergency
Preparedness
Strengthening
Programme)
Year 
2003 (?)
2003 
Aug 2003
Nov–Dec
2003
Jan–Feb
2004
FEWS 
Nov 2004
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Georgia Shaver WFP Country Representative
Deborah Hicks WFP Deputy Head, Emergency and Preparedness Unit
Pierre Lucas WFP Head of VAM Unit 
Volli Carucci WFP MERET Programme Manager 
Paul Turnbull WFP Head, Emergency and Preparedness Unit
Mark Ludwick WFP Consultant – Weather Insurance
Dr Yihenew Zewdie WFP, Safety Net Adviser
Zelalem Ewnetu WFP Field Monitor and VAM Focal Point (Nazaret)
Perrine Geniez WFP VAM 
Mihret Bizuneh WFP VAM
Fikire Negussie UNICEF, seconded to DPPC for ENCU 
Judith Sandford USAID Safety Net Adviser 
Suleiman Mohamed SC UK
Cassandra Chapman SC UK
Nigiste FEWS NET Country Rep (ex WFP/VAM)
Marc Rubin UNICEF, Head Emergency/Early Warning and Disaster Preparedness
Bayene Haile Food Security Coordination Bureau, Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, Head of 
Safety Net and Food Security Programmes
Alistair and Patta Scott-Villiers, Pastoral Communication Initiative, UN OCHA
Sarah Wilson
Laketch Mikael World Bank Rural Development Specialist
Modibu Toure UN Resident Representative
Francoise Leonardi EC Grain Market Expert 
Zaudu EW Head, DPPC 
Alemu Asfaw FEWS NET Country Rep
Berhane Woldetensai Independent Consultant
Suleiman Mohamed SC UK
Dr Girma Seyoum DPPC/UNICEF ENCU Coordinator
Paul Hebert UN OCHA Head of Office 
Lyle Bastin UN OCHA Deputy Head of Office 
Victoria Sekitoleko FAO Country Representative 
Luciano Mosele FAO Emergency Coordinator
Cassandra Chapman SC UK 
Tim Robertson DfID Ethiopia 
Tim Waites DfID Livelihoods Adviser, London (ex Food Security Unit, EC, Addis Ababa)
Ben Watkins WFP VAM Kenya
Alessandro DeMatteis ECHO Regional Office, Nairobi
Neguest Mekonnen UNDP Assistant Resident Representative (Programme)
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Steve Perry USAID, EPSP
Brian Bacon* Food For Peace, Regional Office
Pedro Carrillo* USAID Southern Tier Initiative Program Manager 
John McMahon* USAID
Vivienne (?)* UNICEF
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1. Background 
WFP emergency needs assessments typically depend on
funding from WFP relief operations in the concerned
country. Donors, media and aid partners have become
increasingly critical of the narrow link between needs
assessments and food aid responses. They are concerned
that objectivity of analysis is hampered when assessments
conducted by operational agencies are mainly used to
substantiate a request for funding. Moreover, the need to
recoup expenditures for assessment missions introduces a
bias against conducting assessments where it is judged
unlikely that programme funds will be forthcoming.
Occasional independent “reality checks” and some up-
front funding for assessments that are not automatically
dependent on a later food intervention have been
identified as important complements to WFP’s on-going
practice of emergency needs assessments.
The existing needs assessment schemes address food
insecurity by focusing on precisely estimating the current
food gap.This is problematic in a number of ways, not least
because it assumes a distinction between food and non-food
needs that is hard to maintain in practice. Moreover, the
underlying causes behind recurrent emergency food needs
are insufficiently addressed in existing schemes, in part due
to time, budget, and resource constraints. A series of recent
studies and consultations have identified the specific
shortcomings of the current WFP emergency needs
assessments which arise from assessment approaches and
methodologies.To address these issues, ODAN is working to
refine and standardize approaches and methodologies in
order to improve the quality, validity, credibility, and
transparency of the WFP’s emergency needs assessments.
This is being done in part by drafting and improving an
Emergency Food Security Assessment (EFSA) Handbook.
Against this background, ODAN is commissioning an in-
depth assessment aimed at identifying and analyzing the
shortcomings and missing points in earlier assessments in a
chronically food-insecure country, Ethiopia.This is expected
to contribute to the WFP’s understanding of good needs
assessments practice in situations of recurrent food crises. It
is also intended to contribute to an ECHO-funded project to
strengthen WFP’s emergency needs assessment capacities by
addressing the four thematic areas (see Section 3.).
2. The HPG Proposal
Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG), Overseas Development
Institute (ODI) in London, is one of the world’s leading
teams of independent researchers on humanitarian policy
issues. Its recent work has included a study on emergency
needs assessment (According to Need? Needs assessment and decision-
making in the humanitarian sector, HPG Report 15) and on
measuring impact (Measuring the impact of humanitarian assistance,
HPG Report 17). It is currently engaged on projects looking
at livelihoods and agriculture, and at non-food (particularly
cash) alternatives in humanitarian emergencies.
It is proposed that HPG/ODI should undertake this piece
of work on behalf of ODAN, according to the terms of
reference and budget set out below. It would do this by
commissioning and managing relevant experts to
undertake the field work and write up the results,
providing technical and general management support, as
well as editing and ensuring the quality of the outputs.
ODI would be specifically responsible for:
• Identifying and managing relevant expert consultants
• Providing logistical and administrative support for the
field visits as coordinated by ODAN
• Providing advice and management support to the field
teams
• Commenting on and editing the draft and final reports,
and ensuring that they do not reflect a bias towards any
particular needs assessment method
• Production of final report by 30 June 2005
3. Objectives
The specific objectives of the project are:
• Through a meta-analysis based on desk study and field
observation, to draw the lessons learned from earlier
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assessments and to identify shortcomings or missing
points in earlier assessments.
• To contribute to further refining and improving the
quality of WFP’s emergency needs assessment, by provid-
ing recommendations on the methodologies in general
and specifically for Ethiopia.
• To provide a case study of Ethiopia for a number of them-
atic issues on emergency needs assessment, including:
(i) The role of the market: To identify the potential
role of markets in responding to food crises,
informal cross border trade, formal commercial
trade, national import capacity, price data and
market integration/functioning needs to be
analyzed. Additionally, market intervention as an
alternative response option should be discussed.
(ii) Non-food response options: As a catalyst and
supportive element to food security, non-food res-
ponses and multi-sectoral approaches are generally
reported to be effective but insufficiently addressed
in emergency food security assessment frameworks.
Therefore, appropriate ways to incorporate non-food
factors into the assessment phase needs to be con-
sidered.
(iii) Chronic versus transitory food insecurity: Chronic
versus transitory food insecurity is a useful distinc-
tion that assists in defining appropriate responses.
There is, however, ambiguity in defining and
differentiating between chronic and transitory food
insecurity. Practical methods are needed for diff-
erentiating chronic and transitory food insecurity in
assessments.
(iv) Effects and impacts of food aid: Potential effects and
impacts of food aid on both targeted and non-
targeted households in the intervention areas and on
markets need to be incorporated into emergency
needs assessment frameworks. The effects and
impacts of food aid need to be considered on two
dimensions (a) direct and indirect, and (b) positive
and negative.
The relative weighting to be given to each of these will
depend on discussions in-country. In addition, the project
may identify other topics which merit further attention,
such as how to improve knowledge on population
statistics or on needs in urban areas.
More generally, following preliminary discussions with
the WFP Ethiopia Country Office, it was agreed that the
project team would review the current practice of
emergency food needs assessment in Ethiopia, and
recommend ways of enhancing the contribution of WFP
to the assessment process, including questions of
institutional collaboration.
The following specific questions have been identified to
help guide the review.
1. What is the relationship between the assessment of
emergency food needs and the assessment of safety-net
requirements (transitory vs chronic requirements)?
What different processes are required for each, and
how are they related?
2. How can the requirement for (and appropriateness of)
non-food interventions such as cash for work and vou-
cher schemes best be gauged through assessment? How
are the relative merits of food and non-food interventions
best assessed and their impact evaluated? How can the
question of food aid ‘dependency’ best be assessed?
3. What should be the ‘exit criteria’ for the provision of
emergency food aid - and how does this relate to the
entry criteria? To what extent is this context specific? To
what extent is it related to the existence of adequate
safety-net provision? 
4. Scope of work 
An in-depth assessment of recurrent emergency food
assistance needs will be conducted by representatives from
ODI in Ethiopia.The team from ODI will comprise of five
experts (see “7. Team Composition” below).
The specific activities will be as follows:
4.1 Review of country food security situation using 
secondary sources 
A review of relevant secondary sources, including reports
and survey findings of assessments conducted by donors,
Government, UN agencies, NGOs, research organizations
etc, will be conducted. The aim of this review, which will
be predominantly conducted as desk-exercise, will be to
develop a broad understanding of the nature and severity
of food insecurity in the target country and of the
strengths and weaknesses of assessment methods used to
date. At this stage, possible key background variables and
proxy indicators are screened and selected.
4.2 Review of methods and findings from WFP’s recently
conducted needs assessment 
In consultation with WFP’s in-country assessment team, the
methods, processes and findings of the most recently con-
ducted assessment for the country in question will be an-
alyzed. This will include an analysis of the design, the
indicators and the methods that were used and applied in the
assessment. It will also include a critical review of the find-
ings and recommendations that arose from the assessment.
Activities 4.1 and 4.2 will be used to prioritize which of the
four thematic issues (i.e. the role of markets, non-food
responses, chronic versus transitory food insecurity, and the
effects and impacts of food aid) or major other issues should
be addressed in activity 4.3 in each country.
4.3 In-country studies to consider the thematic issues
Using both qualitative and quantitative data, the ODI team
will test the feasibility of options for improving the needs
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assessment in the target country with special attention to
the four specific thematic issues. To the extent possible
within the constraints of the assessment, these themes will
be analyzed using secondary data sources49 and taking
into consideration institutional capacities.
4.4 Preparation of report containing policy recommendations
A report for the target country is required to: (i) identify
and highlight the major strengths and limitations of
WFP’s current food security and needs assessment
approaches (including methods and processes) in
situations of chronic food insecurity; (ii) make
recommendations on them; and (iii) present a case
study on the four selected thematic issues. The emphasis
should be upon actions that WFP can take within its
current mandate; any recommendations that could be
implemented under a modified WFP mandate or by
other partners should be identified as such. Debriefing
or presentation of the recommendations will be made in
the target country.
5. Outputs
A written report will be prepared in the context of the
target country. Format, length etc. to be agreed.
6. Target countries
Ethiopia
7. Team Composition
Project Leader James Darcy
Field Team Leader Nick Haan
Field Food Security Specialist Nisar Majid
Food Security Specialist 1 Paul Harvey
Food Security Specialist 2 John Seaman 
Project Leader, ODI (HPG): 
James Darcy
Research Fellow and Coordinator
Humanitarian Policy Group
Overseas Development Institute
111 Westminster Bridge Road
London SE1 7JD, UK
Tel. + 44 (0)20 7922 0377
Email: j.darcy@odi.org.uk
Contacts in WFP
Wolfgang Herbinger, Chief, ODAN
Wolfgang.Herbinger@wfp.org, phone +39-06-6513-3123, fax +39-06-6513-3080
Hirotsugu Aiga, Senior Programme Adviser, ODAN
Hirotsugu.Aiga@wfp.org, phone +39-06-6513-2177, fax +39-06-6513-3080
Alexis Hoskins, Programme Officer, ODAN
Alexis.Hoskins@wfp.org, phone +39-06-6513-2494, fax +39-06-6513-3080
Alessio Conforti, Consultat
Alessio.Conforti@wfp.org, phone +39-06-6513-3125, fax +39-06-6513-3080
Emergency Needs Assessment Branch (ODAN),
World Food Programme (WFP)
Via Cesare Giulio Viola 68/70, Parco dei Medici, 00148 Rome, ITALY
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